Abstract
In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant develops an elaborate virtue ethics grounded in two ends that are
also duties: our own perfection and the happiness of others. Kant says apparently inconsistent
things about the nature of these duties, however, leaving ambiguous precisely what the demands
of Kantian virtue are. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant says that duties of virtue govern only our
freedom to set ends, not our freedom of action; that such duties are not coercively enforceable;
and that there are only two of them. Yet in the Doctrine of Elements, Kant seems to contradict
all these commitments by positing numerous additional duties of virtue, at least some of which
(such as duties against suicide or excessive drinking) look to be coercively enforceable
constraints on actions. In this paper I develop a cohesive account of Kant’s virtue ethics that
reconciles these apparent contradictions. We should take Kant at his word, I argue, when he says
that there are only two duties of virtue and that those duties exclusively constrain our internal
freedom to set ends. Adopting the ends of virtue, however, involves cultivating a continuous and
principled commitment to our own perfection and the happiness of others. The duties Kant
describes in the Elements are intended to illustrate what subsidiary commitments would be
entailed by a true commitment to the two required ends of virtue. They are not normatively
independent duties, however, nor (contrary to appearances) are they coercively enforceable
constraints on action.