Whither Neutral Monism?

In Gabriel Vacariu & Gheorghe Stefanov (eds.), Problema minte-creier in neurostiinta cognitiei. Bucharest University Press. pp. 127-134 (2013)
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Abstract

The core insight of neutral monism is that there might be something underlying both mind and matter which is neither and of which mind and matter could be seen as particular manifestations. In this paper, I shall present some directions for developing neutral monism as a metaphysical position on the mind-brain problem and argue that its core insight may be applied to other debates in philosophy of mind, in particular debates about the metaphysics of phenomenologies, such as the phenomenology of thought and cognitive phenomenologies.

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