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  1. added 2018-12-29
    The Concept of Experience in Husserl's Phenomenology and James' Radical Empiricism.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Pragmatism Today 9 (2):33-42.
    In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual structure (...)
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  2. added 2018-12-02
    John Dewey and the Mind-Body Problem in the Context: The Case of «Neutral Monism».Andrii Leonov - 2018 - Actual Problems of Mind. Philosophy Journal 19 (19):72-96.
    The main focus of this paper is the mind-body problem in its relation to the doctrine of ‘neutral monism’ and the question who can be considered its proponents. According to Bertrand Russell, these are Ernst Mach, William James, and John Dewey (to name a few). This paper aims to clarify whether Russell himself was right in his conclusions or not. At first, I start with the clarification of the relation between ‘neutral monism’ and ‘dual-aspect theory’. Secondly, I analyze the ‘big (...)
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  3. added 2018-07-12
    ReMinded of Spinoza: A New Construction of Self and Other.James H. Cumming - manuscript
    Recently revised, this short book is in near final draft. It addresses issues such as consciousness, being, determinism, death, and epistemology. Among other things, the book pierces the illusion of the subject–object divide, which is the primary source of confusion for many philosophy of mind scholars. Puzzles like Mary and her black-and-white room are fully resolved. The key point is that all knowing is self-knowing. One cannot know anything without being it, and what is outside one's own being is inferred, (...)
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  4. added 2018-06-22
    Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky.Baptiste Le Bihan - forthcoming - Philosophical Investigations.
    Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti-realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual-aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by (...)
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  5. added 2017-10-12
    Sense-Data and the Philosophy of Mind: Russell, James, and Mach.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - Principia 6 (2):203-230.
    The theory of knowledge in early twentieth-century Anglo American philosophy was oriented toward phenomenally described cognition. There was a healthy respect for the mind-body problem, which meant that phenomena in both the mental and physical domains were taken seriously. Bertrand Russell's developing position on sense-data and momentary particulars drew upon, and ultimately became like, the neutral monism of Ernst Mach and William James. Due to a more recent behaviorist and physicalist inspired "fear of the mental", this development has been down-played (...)
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  6. added 2017-08-19
    Beyond the Circle of Life.Gregory Nixon (ed.) - 2017 - New York: QuantumDream.
    It seems certain to me that I will die and stay dead. By “I”, I mean me, Greg Nixon, this person, this self-identity. I am so intertwined with the chiasmus of lives, bodies, ecosystems, symbolic intersubjectivity, and life on this particular planet that I cannot imagine this identity continuing alone without them. However, one may survive one’s life by believing in universal awareness, perfection, and the peace that passes all understanding. Perhaps, we bring this back with us to the Source (...)
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  7. added 2017-08-17
    “An Analytic Perspective on Panpsychism: A Book Review of Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (Eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives." Oxford University Press, 2017. 414 Pages. (ISBN: 9780199359943, HB). [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2017 - Metascience 26 (3):471-474.
    This is an important collection in that it fleshes out the vague postulate of panpsychism with a detailed analysis of how it might be understood (if not exactly what it might mean). For the many skeptics who simply dismiss the very idea as ridiculous, there is much here to demonstrate that a good deal of serious thought has gone into this ancient proposal. There are many ways to interpret panpsychism, and they are well represented in this group of philosophers, each (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-01
    Dual‐Aspect Monism.Jiri Benovsky - 2016 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (4):335-352.
    In this article, I am interested in dual-aspect monism as a solution to the mind-body problem. This view is not new, but it is somewhat under-represented in the contemporary debate, and I would like to help it make its way. Dual-aspect monism is a parsimonious, elegant and simple view. It avoids problems with “mental causation”. It naturally explains how and why mental states are correlated with physical states while avoiding any mysteries concerning the nature of this relation. It fits well (...)
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  9. added 2016-12-08
    Sympathy for the Devil: Reconsidering Ernst Mach's Empiricism. [REVIEW]Erik C. Banks - 2012 - Metascience 21 (2):321-330.
    A 2012 review article for Metascience which explains Mach's realistic brand of empiricism, contrasting it with the common phenomenalist reading of Mach by John Blackmore in two recent books.
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  10. added 2016-11-04
    Russellian Physicalism, Bare Structure, and Swapped Inscrutables.Kevin Morris - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):180-198.
    This paper discusses and evaluates a recent argument for the conclusion that an attractive variety of Russellian monism ought to be regarded as a form of physicalism. According to this line of thought, if the Russellian’s “inscrutable” properties are held to ground not only experience, but also the physical structure of the world—and in this sense are not “experience-specific”—they thereby have an unproblematic place in physicalist metaphysics. I argue, in contrast, that there can be a sense in which the Russellian’s (...)
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  11. added 2016-03-22
    Panpsychism and Neutral Monism: How to Make Up One's Mind.Sam Coleman - forthcoming - In Jaskolla Brüntrup (ed.), Panpsychism. Oxford University Press.
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  12. added 2015-08-23
    Mind and Being: The Primacy of Panpsychism.Galen Strawson - 2016 - In Godehard Brüntrup & Ludwig Jaskolla (eds.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 000-00.
    I endorse a 12-word metaphysics. [1] Stoff ist Kraft ≈ being is energy. [2] Wesen ist Werden ≈ being is becoming. [3] Sein ist Sosein ≈ being is qualit[ativit]y. [4] Ansichsein ist Fürsichsein ≈ being is mind. [1]–[3] are plausible metaphysical principles and unprejudiced consideration of what we know about concrete reality obliges us to favor [4], i.e. panpsychism or panexperientialism, above all other positive substantive proposals. For [i] panpsychism is the most ontologically parsimonious view, given that the existence of (...)
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  13. added 2015-04-08
    Review of Erik Banks: Realistic Empiricism (2014). [REVIEW]Mostyn W. Jones - forthcoming - Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    Erik Banks does several things in this slender yet substantial book on realistic empiricism (aka neutral monism). First, he encapsulates the main ideas of this tradition. While he goes into greater depth on some of these ideas than other introductions do, these pages are still accessible to nonspecialists. Second, he traces the the history of this tradition through the Austrian scientist, Ernst Mach, the American psychologist, William James, the British philosopher, Bertrand Russell, and others. These four chapters are a valuable (...)
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  14. added 2015-02-17
    What Is Consciousness?Rodney Bartlett - 2015 - Vixra.Org/Author/Rodney_bartlett.
    On the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's current affairs program "7.30 Report" (29/01/2015), presenter Leigh Sales asked Canadian psychiatrist and author Norman Doidge "What is the difference between the mind and the brain?" Dr. Doidge's reply - "Well, the brain is thought to be roughly three pounds of physical material and nobody, to my mind, has adequately defined and established what the contours of mind are - and that includes all the neuroscientists I know, with respect." -/- I’ve recently read interesting thoughts (...)
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  15. added 2014-10-17
    Pessimism About Russellian Monism.Amy Kind - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. pp. 401-421.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow (...)
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  16. added 2014-07-17
    The Phenomenal Bonding Solution to the Combination Problem.Philip Goff - forthcoming - In L. Jaskolla (ed.), Panpsychism: Contemporary Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
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  17. added 2014-07-17
    Against Constitutive Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Yujin Nagasawa (ed.), Consciousness and the Physical World. Oxford University Press.
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  18. added 2014-03-26
    Is Psycho-Physical Emergentism Committed to Dualism? The Causal Efficacy of Emergent Mental Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):133-151.
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  19. added 2014-02-11
    Whither Neutral Monism?Marius Dumitru - 2013 - In Gabriel Vacariu & Gheorghe Stefanov (eds.), Problema minte-creier in neurostiinta cognitiei. Bucharest University Press. pp. 127-134.
    The core insight of neutral monism is that there might be something underlying both mind and matter which is neither and of which mind and matter could be seen as particular manifestations. In this paper, I shall present some directions for developing neutral monism as a metaphysical position on the mind-brain problem and argue that its core insight may be applied to other debates in philosophy of mind, in particular debates about the metaphysics of phenomenologies, such as the phenomenology of (...)
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  20. added 2012-10-15
    Skrbina's *Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium*. [REVIEW]Gregory Nixon - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (9):116-121.
    Is the great god Pan reborn? For a while there, it seemed every intellectual movement began with the prefix ‘post’, implying non-totality, but now there are indications that ‘pan’ (all) is returning to provide another answer to one of the most basic of ontological questions: What is the relationship of mind to matter? In this important book with 17 different authors, panpsychism is given its due.
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  21. added 2012-03-23
    Neural Correlate of Consciousness in a Single Electron: Radical Answer to “Quantum Theories of Consciousness”.Victor Argonov - 2012 - Neuroquantology 12 (2):276-285.
    We argue that human consciousness may be a property of single electron in the brain. We suppose that each electron in the universe has at least primitive consciousness. Each electron subjectively “observes” its quantum dynamics (energy, momentum, “shape” of wave function) in the form of sensations and other mental phenomena. However, some electrons in neural cells have complex “human” consciousnesses due to complex quantum dynamics in complex organic environment. We discuss neurophysiological and physical aspects of this hypothesis and show that: (...)
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  22. added 2009-06-24
    Neutral Monism Reconsidered.Erik C. Banks - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (2):173-187.
    Neutral monism is a position in metaphysics defended by Mach, James, and Russell in the early twentieth century. It holds that minds and physical objects are essentially two different orderings of the same underlying neutral elements of nature. This paper sets out some of the central concepts, theses and the historical background of ideas that inform this doctrine of elements. The discussion begins with the classic neutral monism of Mach, James, and Russell in the first part of the paper, then (...)
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