An Argument for Dualism from the Lived Experience of being in Space


In a sequel to the author's argument for dualism from the lived experience of time, this paper continues the line of thought initiated by in that study a bit further by considering the implications of our experience of being in space for dualism. I conclude that four-dimensionalism cannot accommodate the facts of our experience of ourselves as being in time - localized in space but not located there after the manner of a material thing. Substance dualism, however, makes perfect sense of all these facts, which helps confirm the natural presumption in favor of that view. REVISED: March 24, 2022 with substantive changes.

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Steven Merle Duncan
Bellevue Community College


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