In Defence of Swamping

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The Swamping Problem shows that two claims are incompatible: the claim that knowledge has more epistemic value than mere true belief and a strict variant of the claim that all epistemic value is truth or instrumental on truth. Most current solutions reject. Carter and Jarvis and Carter, Jarvis and Rubin object instead to a principle that underlies the problem. This paper argues that their objections fail and the problem stands. It also outlines a novel solution which rejects. By carefully distinguishing value from expected value, one can argue that the greater value of knowledge is merely apparent

Author's Profile

Julien Dutant
King's College London


Added to PP

247 (#39,549)

6 months
22 (#63,327)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?