Tenseless/Non-Modal Truthmakers for Tensed/Modal Truths

Logique Et Analyse 199:269-287 (2007)
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Abstract
There is a common approach to metaphysical disputes, which takes language as its starting point, and leads to a view about the range of acceptable metaphysical positions in any such dispute. I argue that this approach rests on accepting what I call the Strong Linguistic Thesis (SLT). In the metaphysical debate about time I argue that the new B-theory has rejected SLT, and for good reasons. The metaphysical debate about modality parallels the early metaphysical debate about time. I argue that a position analogous to the new B-theory of time is available in the modal debate, and has some advantages over its rivals.
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Archival date: 2011-03-20
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