Chance, determinism, and unsettledness

Philosophical Studies 176 (3):781-802 (2018)
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Abstract
A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.
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2019
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EAGCDA-2
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First archival date: 2018-01-15
Latest version: 2 (2019-07-25)
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A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Barnes, Elizabeth & Williams, J. Robert G.

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2018-01-15

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