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  1. added 2019-06-06
    Future Contingents and Aristotle’s Fantasy.Andrea Iacona - 2007 - Critica 39 (117):45-60.
    This paper deals with the problem of future contingents, and focuses on two classical logical principles, excluded middle and bivalence. One may think that different attitudes are to be adopted towards these two principles in order to solve the problem. According to what seems to be a widely held hypothesis, excluded middle must be accepted while bivalence must be rejected. The paper goes against that line of thought. In the first place, it shows how the rejection of bivalence leads to (...)
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  2. added 2019-03-01
    Modelling Deep Indeterminacy.George Darby & Martin Pickup - 2019 - Synthese:1-26.
    This paper constructs a model of metaphysical indeterminacy that can accommodate a kind of ‘deep’ worldly indeterminacy that arguably arises in quantum mechanics via the Kochen-Specker theorem, and that is incompatible with prominent theories of metaphysical indeterminacy such as that in Barnes and Williams (2011). We construct a variant of Barnes and Williams's theory that avoids this problem. Our version builds on situation semantics and uses incomplete, local situations rather than possible worlds to build a model. We evaluate the resulting (...)
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  3. added 2019-02-06
    Chance, Determinism, and Unsettledness.Antony Eagle - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):781-802.
    A previously unrecognised argument against deterministic chance is introduced. The argument rests on the twin ideas that determined outcomes are settled, while chancy outcomes are unsettled, thus making cases of determined but chancy outcomes impossible. Closer attention to tacit assumptions about settledness makes available some principled lines of resistance to the argument for compatibilists about chance and determinism. Yet the costs of maintaining compatibilism may be higher with respect to this argument than with respect to existing incompatibilist arguments.
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  4. added 2018-10-22
    Against 'Against 'Against Vague Existence''.Roberto Loss - 2018 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 11. Oxford University Press. pp. 278-287.
    Alessandro Torza argues that Ted Sider’s Lewisian argument against vague existence is insufficient to rule out the possibility of what he calls ‘super-vague existence’, that is the idea that existence is higher-order vague, for all orders. In this chapter it is argued that the possibility of super-vague existence is ineffective against the conclusion of Sider’s argument since super-vague existence cannot be consistently claimed to be a kind of linguistic vagueness. Torza’s idea of super-vague existence seems to be better suited to (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-01
    The Problem of Future Contingents: Scoping Out a Solution.Patrick Todd - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Various philosophers have long since been attracted to the doctrine that future contingent propositions systematically fail to be true - what is sometimes called the doctrine of the open future. However, open futurists have always struggled to articulate how their view interacts with standard principles of classical logic - most notably, with the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). For consider the following two claims: (a) Trump will be impeached tomorrow; (b) Trump will not be impeached tomorrow. According to the kind (...)
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  6. added 2017-04-11
    Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - forthcoming - Noûs.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  7. added 2016-06-10
    Causal and Moral Indeterminacy.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Ratio 29 (4):434-447.
    This paper argues that several sorts of metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy afflict the causal relation. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then indeterminacy in the causal relation results in indeterminacy of moral responsibility more generally.
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  8. added 2015-08-31
    Ein bisschen Embryo? Begriffliche, ontologische und normative Überlegungen zur totipotenzbasierten Legaldefinition von 'Embryo'.Geert Keil - 2014 - In Thomas Heinemann Hans-Georg Dederer & Tobias Cantz (eds.), Entwicklungsbiologische Totipotenz in Ethik und Recht. Zur normativen Bewertung von totipotenten menschlichen Zellen. pp. 251-287.
    Im deutschen Embryonenschutz- und im Stammzellgesetz sind zwei Rechtsbegriffe von 'Embryo' definiert worden, die sich auf die Zelleigenschaft der Totipotenz stützen und dieser damit eine ontologische und normative Bedeutung beimessen, die angesichts der vielfältigen divergierenden Intuitionen und Argumente zur sogenannten Statusfrage nicht leicht zu rechtfertigen ist. Der vorliegende Beitrag diskutiert die Schwierigkeiten, den ontologischen, moralischen und rechtlichen Status totipotenter Humanzellen plausibel zu begründen, und argumentiert insbesondere, dass zwischen Grundannahmen der Substanzontologie und naturphilosophischen Kontinuitätsüberlegungen unaufhebbare Spannungen bestehen, die der Gesetzgeber durch (...)
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  9. added 2015-07-17
    Why the Vagueness Paradox is Amazing.Bryan Frances - 2018 - Think 17 (50):27-38.
    One of the hardest problems in philosophy, one that has been around for over two thousand years without generating any significant consensus on its solution, involves the concept of vagueness: a word or concept that doesn't have a perfectly precise meaning. There is an argument that seems to show that the word or concept simply must have a perfectly precise meaning, as violently counterintuitive as that is. Unfortunately, the argument is usually so compressed that it is difficult to see why (...)
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  10. added 2014-03-09
    The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Logic 7:32-47.
    The goals of this paper are two-fold: I wish to clarify the Aristotelian conception of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical rather than a semantic or logical principle, and to defend the truth of the principle in this sense. First I will explain what it in fact means that the law of non-contradiction is a metaphysical principle. The core idea is that the law of non-contradiction is a general principle derived from how things are in the world. For example, (...)
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  11. added 2013-03-28
    The Problem with Truthmaker-Gap Epistemicism.Mark Jago - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form ‘it is (...)
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  12. added 2012-07-19
    A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Elizabeth Barnes & J. Robert G. Williams - 2011 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics volume 6. Oxford University Press. pp. 103-148.
    If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.
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  13. added 2011-09-17
    Commentary on Kathrin Koslicki’s The Structure of Objects.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2011 - Humana Mente 4 (19):197-204.
    This is a critical commentary on Kathrin Koslicki's book The Structure of Objects (OUP, 2008).
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