Values, Preferences, Meaningful Choice

Abstract

Many fields (social choice, welfare economics, recommender systems) assume people express what benefits them via their 'revealed preferences'. Revealed preferences have well-documented problems when used this way, but are hard to displace in these fields because, as an information source, they are simple, universally applicable, robust, and high-resolution. In order to compete, other information sources (about participants' values, capabilities and functionings, etc) would need to match this. I present a conception of values as *attention policies resulting from constitutive judgements*, and use it to build an alternative preference relation, Meaningful Choice, which retains many desirable features of revealed preference.

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2021-06-09

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