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  1. Aggregation Without Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being.Jake Nebel - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being. How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interpersonal comparability of well-being is hidden in Harsanyi's premises. Others argue that it is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi's theorem, which is not presupposed by any one (...)
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  2. Utils and Shmutils.Jacob M. Nebel - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):571-599.
    Matthew Adler's Measuring Social Welfare is an introduction to the social welfare function (SWF) methodology. This essay questions some ideas at the core of the SWF methodology having to do with the relation between the SWF and the measure of well-being. The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities, there are multiple scales that can be used to represent the same information about well-being; no one scale (...)
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  3. Цивилизационни доминанти на дългия период на социално равенство или неравенство в СССР, съвременна Русия и България.Vasil Penchev - 2008 - In Васил Проданов (ed.), НАЦИОНАЛНО, БАЛКАНСКО, ЕВРОПЕЙСКО - ТЕНДЕНЦИИ НА РАВЕНСТВО И НЕРАВЕНСТВО. pp. 42-49.
    Степента на социлано равенство или неравенство е обсъдена от гледна точка на "цивилизационната парадигма" в ис торичта и нейната философия, конкретно в рамките на православната цивилизация. Налице са устойчиви доминанти, релевантни на "дългите периоди" или "бавните времена".
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  4. Claude Ake o rozwoju i demokracji w Afryce.Krzysztof Trzcinski - 2012 - In R. Vorbrich (ed.), Rozwój a kultura. Perspektywy poznawcze i praktyczne. Wrocław: pp. 89-107.
    W artykule tym przedstawiam koncepcję rozwoju autorstwa wybitnego nigeryjskiego myśliciela i demokraty Claude’a Akego. Ake zaproponował abstrakcyjny paradygmat rozwoju społeczeństw afrykańskich w warunkach demokracji. Paradygmat ten opiera się na rolnej strategii rozwoju, zgodnie z którą powinien być on uzyskiwany małymi krokami i pierwotnie generowany na wsi. Ake zdefiniował rozwój jako proces, „poprzez który ludzie kształtują i zmieniają siebie oraz swoją sytuację życiową, by osiągać wyższe poziomy cywilizacyjne, zgodnie z własnymi wyborami i wartościami”. Zdaniem nigeryjskiego myśliciela, rozwój jako proces zbiorowy powinien (...)
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  5. A Formal Theory of Democratic Deliberation.Hun Chung & John Duggan - 2020 - American Political Science Review 114 (1):14-35.
    Inspired by impossibility theorems of social choice theory, many democratic theorists have argued that aggregative forms of democracy cannot lend full democratic justification for the collective decisions reached. Hence, democratic theorists have turned their attention to deliberative democracy, according to which “outcomes are democratically legitimate if and only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals” (Cohen 1997a, 73). However, relatively little work has been done to offer a formal theory of democratic deliberation. This (...)
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  6. A Logic for Reasoning About Group Norms.Daniele Porello - 2018 - In Jan M. Broersen, Gabriella Pigozzi, Cleo Condoravdi & Shyam Nair (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems - 14th International Conference, {DEON} 2018, Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 3-6, 2018. Londra, Regno Unito: pp. 301--315.
    We present a number of modal logics to reason about group norms. As a preliminary step, we discuss the ontological status of the group to which the norms are applied, by adapting the classification made by Christian List of collective attitudes into aggregated, common, and corporate attitudes. Accordingly, we shall introduce modality to capture aggregated, common, and corporate group norms. We investigate then the principles for reasoning about those types of modalities. Finally, we discuss the relationship between group norms and (...)
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  7. Reasoning About Development: Essays on Amartya Sen's Capability Approach.Thomas R. Wells - 2013 - Dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam
    Over the last 30 years the Indian philosopher-economist Amartya Sen has developed an original normative approach to the evaluation of individual and social well-being. The foundational concern of this ‘capability approach’ is the real freedom of individuals to achieve the kind of lives they have reason to value. This freedom is analysed in terms of an individual’s ‘capability’ to achieve combinations of such intrinsically valuable ‘beings and doings’ (‘functionings’) as being sufficiently nourished and freely expressing one’s political views. In this (...)
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  8. Democracia, Cidadania e Direitos Humanos no Brasil.Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - manuscript
    O sistema político brasileiro preenche, formalmente, os requisitos mínimos de uma poliarquia, ou seja, um sistema democrático em que o poder é atribuído com base em eleições livres e em que há ampla participação política e concorrência pelos cargos eletivos. Esse sistema implica disputa pelo poder, tolerância à diversidade de opiniões e oposição política. No entanto, o que se percebe na sociedade é que essa estrutura formal não garante a democratização dos recursos socialmente produzidos, como bens, direitos e serviços básicos (...)
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  9. The Premises of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem Are Not Simultaneously Justified.Franz Dietrich - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):56-73.
    Condorcet's famous jury theorem reaches an optimistic conclusion on the correctness of majority decisions, based on two controversial premises about voters: they are competent and vote independently, in a technical sense. I carefully analyse these premises and show that: whether a premise is justi…ed depends on the notion of probability considered; none of the notions renders both premises simultaneously justi…ed. Under the perhaps most interesting notions, the independence assumption should be weakened.
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  10. Condorcet’s jury theorem: General will and epistemic democracy.Miljan Vasić - 2018 - Theoria: Beograd 61 (4):147-170.
    My aim in this paper is to explain what Condorcet’s jury theorem is, and to examine its central assumptions, its significance to the epistemic theory of democracy and its connection with Rousseau’s theory of general will. In the first part of the paper I will analyze an epistemic theory of democracy and explain how its connection with Condorcet’s jury theorem is twofold: the theorem is at the same time a contributing historical source, and the model used by the authors to (...)
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  11. Independent Opinions? On the Causal Foundations of Belief Formation and Jury Theorems.Franz Dietrich & Kai Spiekermann - 2013 - Mind 122 (487):655-685.
    Democratic decision-making is often defended on grounds of the ‘wisdom of crowds’: decisions are more likely to be correct if they are based on many independent opinions, so a typical argument in social epistemology. But what does it mean to have independent opinions? Opinions can be probabilistically dependent even if individuals form their opinion in causal isolation from each other. We distinguish four probabilistic notions of opinion independence. Which of them holds depends on how individuals are causally affected by environmental (...)
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  12. A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736.
    A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all or (...)
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  13. Hopeful Losers? A Moral Case for Mixed Electoral Systems.Loren King - 2015 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 10 (2):107-121.
    Liberal democracies encourage citizen participation and protect our freedoms, yet these regimes elect politicians and decide important issues with electoral and legislative systems that are less inclusive than other arrangements. Some citizens inevitably have more influence than others. Is this a problem? Yes, because similarly just but more inclusive systems are possible. Political theorists and philosophers should be arguing for particular institutional forms, with particular geographies, consistent with justice. -/- Les démocraties libérales encouragent la participation citoyenne et protègent nos libertés. (...)
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  14. How to Condorcet a Goldman.Michele Palmira - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):413-425.
    In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin I. Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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  15. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalised. Part Two: The Premise-Based Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):787–814.
    How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigma-algebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'event-wise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...)
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  16. Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
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  17. Bayesian Group Belief.Franz Dietrich - 2010 - Social Choice and Welfare 35 (4):595-626.
    If a group is modelled as a single Bayesian agent, what should its beliefs be? I propose an axiomatic model that connects group beliefs to beliefs of group members, who are themselves modelled as Bayesian agents, possibly with different priors and different information. Group beliefs are proven to take a simple multiplicative form if people’s information is independent, and a more complex form if information overlaps arbitrarily. This shows that group beliefs can incorporate all information spread over the individuals without (...)
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  18. General Representation of Epistemically Optimal Procedures.Franz Dietrich - 2006 - Social Choice and Welfare 2 (26):263-283.
    Assuming that votes are independent, the epistemically optimal procedure in a binary collective choice problem is known to be a weighted supermajority rule with weights given by personal log-likelihood-ratios. It is shown here that an analogous result holds in a much more general model. Firstly, the result follows from a more basic principle than expected-utility maximisation, namely from an axiom (Epistemic Monotonicity) which requires neither utilities nor prior probabilities of the ‘correctness’ of alternatives. Secondly, a person’s input need not be (...)
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  19. How to Reach Legitimate Decisions When the Procedure is Controversial.Franz Dietrich - 2005 - Social Choice and Welfare 1 (24):363-393.
    Imagine a group that faces a decision problem but does not agree on which decision procedure is appropriate. In that case, can a decision be reached that respects the procedural concerns of the group? There is a sense in which legitimate decisions are possible even if people disagree on which procedure to use. I propose to decide in favour of an option which maximizes the number of persons whose judged-right procedure happens to entail this decision given the profile. This decision (...)
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  20. Welfarism, Preferencism, Judgmentism.Franz Dietrich - manuscript
    In a single framework, I address the question of the informational basis for evaluating social states. I particularly focus on information about individual welfare, individual preferences and individual (moral) judgments, but the model is also open to any other informational input deemed relevant, e.g. sources of welfare and motivations behind preferences. In addition to proving some possibility and impossibility results, I discuss objections against using information about only one aspect (e.g. using only preference information). These objections suggest a multi-aspect informational (...)
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  21. Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge.Michael Fuerstein - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 74-93.
    How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in large part from a (...)
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  22. Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Epistemology.Fabienne Peter - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):329-353.
    A conception of legitimacy is at the core of normative theories of democracy. Many different conceptions of legitimacy have been put forward, either explicitly or implicitly. In this article, I shall first provide a taxonomy of conceptions of legitimacy that can be identified in contemporary democratic theory. The taxonomy covers both aggregative and deliberative democracy. I then argue for a conception of democratic legitimacy that takes the epistemic dimension of public deliberation seriously. In contrast to standard interpretations of epistemic democracy, (...)
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Arrow's Theorem
  1. Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice: A Review.Christian List - 2018 - In André Bächtiger, Jane Mansbridge, John Dryzek & Mark Warren (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In (...)
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  2. Intelligence Via Ultrafilters: Structural Properties of Some Intelligence Comparators of Deterministic Legg-Hutter Agents.Samuel Alexander - 2019 - Journal of Artificial General Intelligence 10 (1):24-45.
    Legg and Hutter, as well as subsequent authors, considered intelligent agents through the lens of interaction with reward-giving environments, attempting to assign numeric intelligence measures to such agents, with the guiding principle that a more intelligent agent should gain higher rewards from environments in some aggregate sense. In this paper, we consider a related question: rather than measure numeric intelligence of one Legg- Hutter agent, how can we compare the relative intelligence of two Legg-Hutter agents? We propose an elegant answer (...)
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  3. Why Arrow's Theorem Matters for Political Theory Even If Preference Cycles Never Occur.Sean Ingham - forthcoming - Public Choice.
    Riker (1982) famously argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem undermined the logical foundations of “populism”, the view that in a democracy, laws and policies ought to express “the will of the people”. In response, his critics have questioned the use of Arrow’s theorem on the grounds that not all configurations of preferences are likely to occur in practice; the critics allege, in particular, that majority preference cycles, whose possibility the theorem exploits, rarely happen. In this essay, I argue that the critics’ (...)
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  4. The Wisdom of Collective Grading and the Effects of Epistemic and Semantic Diversity.Aidan Lyon & Michael Morreau - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):99-116.
    A computer simulation is used to study collective judgements that an expert panel reaches on the basis of qualitative probability judgements contributed by individual members. The simulated panel displays a strong and robust crowd wisdom effect. The panel's performance is better when members contribute precise probability estimates instead of qualitative judgements, but not by much. Surprisingly, it doesn't always hurt for panel members to interpret the probability expressions differently. Indeed, coordinating their understandings can be much worse.
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  5. From Degrees of Belief to Binary Beliefs: Lessons From Judgment-Aggregation Theory.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (5):225-270.
    What is the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the former—a so-called “belief-binarization rule”—without running into difficulties such as the lottery paradox? We show that this problem can be usefully analyzed from the perspective of judgment-aggregation theory. Although some formal similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation have been noted before, the connection between the two problems has not yet been studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek (...)
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  6. Teoría fenomenológica general del bienestar y la elección social.Rodrigo Lopez-Pablos - 2013 - Revista de Economía Política de Buenos Aires 12 (7):105-133.
    By introducing elements of phenomenological philosophy to the analysis of human needs in economics; from Sartrean postulates as well as the nature and essence of individual’s needs, has been revealed a theorethical framework that serves to ponder human being’s existential behavior by means of their phenomenologic social choices and welfare. Defining a planning agent under strong assumptions of rationality and projective efficacious capabilities, the Arrow’s theorem has been proved for the economic agent aware of its finitude in this world.
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  7. Single-Peakedness and Semantic Dimensions of Preferences.Daniele Porello - 2016 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 24 (4).
    Among the possible solutions to the paradoxes of collective preferences, single-peakedness is significant because it has been associated to a suggestive conceptual interpretation: a single-peaked preference profile entails that, although individuals may disagree on which option is the best, they conceptualize the choice along a shared unique dimension, i.e. they agree on the rationale of the collective decision. In this article, we discuss the relationship between the structural property of singlepeakedness and its suggested interpretation as uni-dimensionality of a social choice. (...)
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  8. Grading in Groups.Michael Morreau - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):323-352.
    Juries, committees and experts panels commonly appraise things of one kind or another on the basis of grades awarded by several people. When everybody's grading thresholds are known to be the same, the results sometimes can be counted on to reflect the graders’ opinion. Otherwise, they often cannot. Under certain conditions, Arrow's ‘impossibility’ theorem entails that judgements reached by aggregating grades do not reliably track any collective sense of better and worse at all. These claims are made by adapting the (...)
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  9. Ranking Judgments in Arrow’s Setting.Daniele Porello - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):199-210.
    In this paper, I investigate the relationship between preference and judgment aggregation, using the notion of ranking judgment introduced in List and Pettit. Ranking judgments were introduced in order to state the logical connections between the impossibility theorem of aggregating sets of judgments and Arrow’s theorem. I present a proof of the theorem concerning ranking judgments as a corollary of Arrow’s theorem, extending the translation between preferences and judgments defined in List and Pettit to the conditions on the aggregation procedure.
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  10. Judgement Aggregation Under Constraints.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2008 - In Thomas Boylan & Ruvin Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. London, UK: Routledge. pp. 111-123.
    In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...)
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  11. A Proof-Theoretical View of Collective Rationality.Daniele Porello - 2013 - In Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference of Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2013).
    The impossibility results in judgement aggregation show a clash between fair aggregation procedures and rational collective outcomes. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the notion of rational outcome by proposing a proof-theoretical understanding of collective rationality. In particular, we use the analysis of proofs and inferences provided by linear logic in order to define a fine-grained notion of group reasoning that allows for studying collective rationality with respect to a number of logics. We analyse the well-known paradoxes in (...)
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  12. Perfectly Marked, Fair Tests with Unfair Marks.Joseph S. Fulda - 2009 - The Mathematical Gazette 93 (527):256-260.
    Shows how, as a consequence of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem, objectivity in grading is chimerical, given a sufficiently knowledgeable teacher (of his students, not his subject) in a sufficiently small class. -/- PDF available from JStor only; permission to post full version previously granted by journal editors and publisher expired. -/- Unpublished reply posted gratis.
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  13. Representación Democrática, Reglas de Decisión y la Constitución.Ricardo Restrepo - manuscript
    Este artículo brinda algunas respuestas y alternativas a ciertos problemas y propuestas en el área de la teoría democrática. El ensayo tiene como enfoque la cuestión de distinguir sistemas que pueden parecer democráticos sin serlo de sistemas realmente democráticos. Develando algunos actores disfrazados del discurso democrático en América Latina, el artículo argumenta que es preferible la regla de la mayoría como base para la identificación del bien común por medio del interés general, que reglas de minorías, consentimiento total o bases (...)
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  14. On the Elusive Notion of Meta-Agreement.Valeria Ottonelli & Daniele Porello - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):68-92.
    Public deliberation has been defended as a rational and noncoercive way to overcome paradoxical results from democratic voting, by promoting consensus on the available alternatives on the political agenda. Some critics have argued that full consensus is too demanding and inimical to pluralism and have pointed out that single-peakedness, a much less stringent condition, is sufficient to overcome voting paradoxes. According to these accounts, deliberation can induce single-peakedness through the creation of a ‘meta-agreement’, that is, agreement on the dimension according (...)
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  15. The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; at most (...)
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  16. Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation: The General Case.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):1067-1095.
    In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there (...)
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  17. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and the National Security State.S. M. Amadae - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (4):734-743.
    This paper critically engages Philip Mirowki's essay, "The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of science." It argues that although the cold war context of anti-democratic elitism best suited for making decisions about engaging in nuclear war may seem to be politically and ideologically motivated, in fact we need to carefully consider the arguments underlying the new rational choice based political philosophies of the post-WWII era typified by Arrow's impossibility theorem. A distrust of (...)
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  18. The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review.Christian List - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):179-207.
    This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers (...)
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  19. Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence From Deliberative Polls.Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin & Iain McLean - 2013 - Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95.
    Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have (...)
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  20. Optimality Theory and the Problem of Constraint Aggregation.Christian List & Daniel Harbour - 2000 - In Rajesh Bhatt & Patrick Hawley (eds.), MIT Working Papers in Philosophy and Linguistics, Volume 1.
    This paper applies ideas and tools from social choice theory (such as Arrow's theorem and related results) to linguistics. Specifically, the paper investigates the problem of constraint aggregation in optimality theory from a social-choice-theoretic perspective.
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  21. Aggregation Theory and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others.Franz Dietrich - 2015 - Journal of Economic Theory 160:463-493.
    I propose a relevance-based independence axiom on how to aggregate individual yes/no judgments on given propositions into collective judgments: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on propositions which are relevant to that proposition. This axiom contrasts with the classical independence axiom: the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on people’s judgments on the same proposition. I generalize the premise-based rule and the sequential-priority rule to an arbitrary priority order of the propositions, instead of a (...)
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  22. Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
    In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby (...)
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  23. Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems.Franz Dietrich - 2006 - Journal of Economic Theory 1 (126):286-298.
    The aggregation of individual judgments over interrelated propositions is a newly arising field of social choice theory. I introduce several independence conditions on judgment aggregation rules, each of which protects against a specific type of manipulation by agenda setters or voters. I derive impossibility theorems whereby these independence conditions are incompatible with certain minimal requirements. Unlike earlier impossibility results, the main result here holds for any (non-trivial) agenda. However, independence conditions arguably undermine the logical structure of judgment aggregation. I therefore (...)
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  24. Majority Voting on Restricted Domains.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Journal of Economic Theory 145 (2):512-543.
    In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments su¢ - cient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen’s triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a (...)
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  25. The Impossibility of Unbiased Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (3):281-299.
    Standard impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions either use a controversial systematicity condition or apply only to agendas of propositions with rich logical connections. Are there any serious impossibilities without these restrictions? We prove an impossibility theorem without requiring systematicity that applies to most standard agendas: Every judgment aggregation function (with rational inputs and outputs) satisfying a condition called unbiasedness is dictatorial (or effectively dictatorial if we remove one of the agenda conditions). Our agenda conditions are tight. (...)
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  26. Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2004 - Synthese 140 (1-2):207 - 235.
    The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, they invite comparison (...)
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  27. Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result.Christian List & Philip Pettit - 2002 - Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
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  28. Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction.Christian List - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier.
    The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, (...)
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