Acting on Behalf of Another

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):540-555 (2022)
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This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf.

Author Profiles

Alexander Edlich
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Jonas Vandieken
University of Toronto, St. George Campus


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