An inconsistency in the (supposed) prohibitions of philosophy

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In different papers, David Liggins and Chris Daly tell philosophers what they should not do. There is no sign of them withdrawing any of these prohibitions, but I show that they fail to be consistent when asserting them. The inconsistency concerns when a philosopher should defer to the empirical findings of science.
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First archival date: 2015-10-01
Latest version: 11 (2019-03-23)
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Realism and Reason.Putnam, Hilary
In Defence of Error Theory.Daly, Chris & Liggins, David
Deferentialism.Daly, Chris & Liggins, David
Animalism and Deferentialism.Daly, Chris & Liggins, David

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