A solution to the surprise exam paradox

Filozofia 72 (4):325-327 (2017)
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The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
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First archival date: 2015-04-17
Latest version: 12 (2017-04-20)
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