A solution to the surprise exam paradox

Filozofia 72 (4):325-327 (2017)
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Abstract

The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.

Author's Profile

Terence Rajivan Edward
University of Manchester (PhD)

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