A value-based solution to the surprise exam paradox

Philosophical Pathways (221):1-2 (2018)
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Abstract
I identify an assumption that the students should not rely on: if the teacher believes that the exam would not be a surprise on a certain day, the teacher will not give the exam on that day. The reason I present for not making this assumption does not involve doubting the moral goodness of the teacher. But it does involve making a value judgment.
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2018
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EDWAST-3
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First archival date: 2015-05-04
Latest version: 17 (2018-03-31)
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2015-05-04

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