From an analysis of the notion of organization to limits on conceptual diversity

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Abstract
This paper evaluates an argument from Donald Davidson against alternative conceptual schemes. The argument can be divided into two stages. In the first stage it is argued that only pluralities can be organized. In the second stage it is argued that if our conceptual scheme organizes a plurality and someone else’s scheme also organizes that plurality, there must be a set of common concepts, hence someone else’s scheme can never be an alternative scheme to ours. I object to the first stage of the argument.
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2013
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First archival date: 2013-04-02
Latest version: 3 (2013-05-29)
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2013-04-02

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