From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2014-10-10
Latest version: 9 (2015-02-18)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
227 ( #21,879 of 54,525 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #36,269 of 54,525 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.