From the Myth of the Given to Radical Conceptual Diversity

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This paper evaluates the following argument, suggested in the writings of Donald Davidson: if there is such a thing as the given, then there can be alternative conceptual schemes; there cannot be alternative conceptual schemes; therefore there is no such thing as the given.
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First archival date: 2014-10-10
Latest version: 9 (2015-02-18)
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