Non-branching personal persistence

Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EGUNPP
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-07-21
Latest version: 2 (2019-07-25)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 61 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-07-18

Total views
65 ( #30,245 of 41,458 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #28,335 of 41,458 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.