Non-branching personal persistence

Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Given reductionism about people, personal persistence must fundamentally consist in some kind of impersonal continuity relation. Typically, these continuity relations can hold from one to many. And, if they can, the analysis of personal persistence must include a non-branching clause to avoid non-transitive identities or multiple occupancy. It is far from obvious, however, what form this clause should take. This paper argues that previous accounts are inadequate and develops a new proposal.

Author's Profile

Johan E. Gustafsson
University of York


Added to PP

184 (#41,391)

6 months
31 (#34,916)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?