Inconsistency and replacement

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Abstract
The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.
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EKLIAR-5
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Archival date: 2020-05-04
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2017-02-16

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