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Inconsistency and replacement
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):387-402 (2019)
Abstract
The article is an extended critical discussion of Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth. Scharp’s case for the claim that the concept of truth is inconsistent is criticized, and so is his case for the claim that the concept of truth must be replaced because of its inconsistency.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2017-02-16
Downloads
765 (#27,500)
6 months
170 (#18,749)
2017-02-16
Downloads
765 (#27,500)
6 months
170 (#18,749)
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