Fragmentation and information access

In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
In order to predict and explain behavior, one cannot specify the mental state of an agent merely by saying what information she possesses.  Instead one must specify what information is available to an agent relative to various purposes.  Specifying mental states in this way allows us to accommodate cases of imperfect recall, cognitive accomplishments involved in logical deduction, the mental states of confused or fragmented subjects, and the difference between propositional knowledge and know-how
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