‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism

Philosophy of Science 87 (4):727-754 (2020)
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Abstract

Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). In this paper, I outline the basis for a new, non-probabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in `Probability and Partial Belief'. I show how, and to what extent, `Ramseyan comparativism' might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism traditionally relies on.

Author's Profile

Edward J. R. Elliott
University of Leeds

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