Unawareness and Implicit Belief

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Possible worlds models of belief have difficulties accounting for unawareness, the inability to entertain (and hence believe) certain propositions. Accommodating unawareness is important for adequately modelling epistemic states, and representing the informational content to which agents have in principle access given their explicit beliefs. In this paper, I develop a model of explicit belief, awareness, and informational content, along with an sound and complete axiomatisation. I furthermore defend the model against the seminal impossibility result of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, according to which three intuitive conditions preclude non-trivial unawareness on any possible worlds model of belief.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-06-25
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
106 ( #39,171 of 58,375 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #23,159 of 58,375 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.