What is 'Real' in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In a pair of recent papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose—specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2021-01-15
Latest version: 2 (2021-01-15)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
103 ( #43,696 of 2,448,312 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #19,335 of 2,448,312 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.