What is 'Real' in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence

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Abstract
According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In a pair of recent papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose—specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.
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First archival date: 2021-01-15
Latest version: 2 (2021-01-15)
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2020-11-03

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