What Is ‘Real’ in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):102-116 (2022)
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ABSTRACT According to comparativism, comparative confidence is more fundamental than absolute confidence. In two recent AJP papers, Stefánsson has argued that comparativism is capable of explaining interpersonal confidence comparisons. In this paper, I will argue that Stefansson’s proposed explanation is inadequate; that we have good reasons to think that comparativism cannot handle interpersonal comparisons; and that the best explanation of interpersonal comparisons requires thinking about confidence in a fundamentally different way than that which comparativists propose: specifically, we should think of confidence as a dimensionless quantity.
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First archival date: 2021-01-15
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