Horror, Fear, and the Sartrean Account of Emotions

Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (2):209-225 (2016)
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Phenomenological approaches to affectivity have long recognized the vital role that emotions occupy in our lives. In this paper, I engage with Jean-Paul Sartre's well-known and highly influential theory of the emotions as it is advanced in his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions. I examine whether Sartre's account offers two inconsistent explications of the nature of emotions. I argue that despite appearances there is a reading of Sartre's theory that is free of inconsistencies. Ultimately, I highlight a novel reading of Sartre's account of the emotions: one that is both phenomenologically accurate and supported by textual evidence.

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Andreas Elpidorou
University of Louisville


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