Heidegger’s Distinction between Scientific and Philosophical Judgments

Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):33-41 (2007)
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Abstract

Some commentators, such as Jürgen Habermas, think Martin Heidegger is guilty of a performative contradiction, because he uses judgments to situate judgments in a non-judicative context. This paper defends Heidegger by distinguishing two senses of judgment in his thought. Temporality enables two different directions of inquiry and hence two kinds of judgment. Scientific judgments arise when we turn from the temporal horizon toward entities alone; phenomenological judgments arise when we return to the temporal horizon in which such entities are accessible. Consequently, using phenomenological judgments to show the condition for the possibility of scientific judgments is not contradictory.

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Chad Engelland
University of Dallas

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