The Disappearing Agent

In Berčić Boran (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. Rijeka, Croatia: pp. 235-253 (2017)
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In this paper I will address a specific luck argument that has been put forward against event causal libertarianism: the disappearing agent objection. I will show why some replies are unsatisfactory while dealing with this objection and, by criticizing the notion of settling and the conception of selfhood invoked by this objection I’ll suggest that the event causal libertarian should reject the objection as it rests on an unacceptable ontology and that consequently, he should bite the bullet and admit that there is some residual arbitrariness in torn decision making.
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