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Aesthetic Properties, Mind-Independence, and Companions in Guilt
In Christopher Cowie & Rach Cosker-Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge (2019)
Abstract
I first show how one might argue for a mind-independent conception of beauty and artistic merit. I then discuss whether this makes aesthetic judgements suitable to undermine skeptical worries about the existence of mind-independent moral value and categorical reasons.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2019-02-06
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1,100 (#15,810)
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164 (#20,067)
2019-02-06
Downloads
1,100 (#15,810)
6 months
164 (#20,067)
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