A simple logic for comparisons and vagueness

Synthese 123 (2):263-278 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article provide an intuitive semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a “how much” value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari’s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules. It is argued that CL provides a better analysis of predicate vagueness than classical logic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory.
Reprint years
2004
PhilPapers/Archive ID
EVEASL
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-09-30
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
196 ( #13,093 of 37,117 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #28,802 of 37,117 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.