A simple logic for comparisons and vagueness

Synthese 123 (2):263-278 (2000)
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Abstract
This article provide an intuitive semantic account of a new logic for comparisons (CL), in which atomic statements are assigned both a classical truth-value and a “how much” value or extension in the range [0, 1]. The truth-value of each comparison is determined by the extensions of its component sentences; the truth-value of each atomic depends on whether its extension matches a separate standard for its predicate; everything else is computed classically. CL is less radical than Casari’s comparative logics, in that it does not allow for the formation of comparative statements out of truth-functional molecules. It is argued that CL provides a better analysis of predicate vagueness than classical logic, fuzzy logic or supervaluation theory.
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2004
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Archival date: 2014-09-30
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Vagueness.Williamson, Timothy
Complex Predicates.Stalnaker, Robert

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2009-01-28

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