Actuality and the a priori

Philosophical Studies 175 (3):809-830 (2018)
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Abstract
We consider a natural-language sentence that cannot be formally represented in a first-order language for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. We also prove this claim in the “Appendix” section. It turns out, however, that the most natural ways to repair the expressive inadequacy of the first-order language render moot the original philosophical motivation of formalizing a priori knowability as necessity along the diagonal.
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Archival date: 2017-03-08
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