Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View

Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304 (2020)
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Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, assuming dubious epistemic principles that testimony cannot generate knowledge and understanding. The final part of this paper will be devoted to presenting the advantages of the reductionist approach to explaining the phenomenon of group testimony.

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Domingos Faria
University of Porto


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