Practical Know‐Wh

Noûs 51 (4):855-870 (2017)
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The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.
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First archival date: 2016-04-16
Latest version: 3 (2017-12-05)
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Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:00-00.

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