Practical Know‐Wh
Noûs 51 (4):855-870 (2017)
Abstract
The central and paradigmatic cases of knowledge discussed in philosophy involve the possession of truth. Is there in addition a distinct type of practical knowledge, which does not aim at the truth? This question is often approached through asking whether states attributed by “know-how” locutions are distinct from states attributed by “know-that”. This paper argues that the question of practical knowledge can be raised not only about some cases of “know-how” attributions, but also about some cases of so-called “know-wh” attributions; and that certain features of this practical knowledge-wh put pressure on the standard analysis of know-wh.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2016, 2017
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FARPK
Upload history
Added to PP index
2016-04-16
Total views
429 ( #11,896 of 55,816 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #22,948 of 55,816 )
2016-04-16
Total views
429 ( #11,896 of 55,816 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #22,948 of 55,816 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.