Interrogating the Linguistic Argument for KK

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The KK thesis says (roughly) that if S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P. Though controversial, KK may be able to neatly explain an otherwise puzzling datum: namely, that assertions of the form “P, but I don’t know if I know that P” are infelicitous. If KK is true, those assertions are unknowable, and hence guaranteed to violate a knowledge norm on assertion. For many, the fact that KK (if true) can so explain that datum is a strong consideration in its favor. This paper undermines that argument for KK. It first goes on the offensive, arguing that the more plausible “weak KK” gives a worse explanation of the datum. It then proposes an explanation which does not rely on any version of KK, but rather a "believe that you know" norm on assertion. Together, these moves undermine the linguistic argument for KK, and so significantly weaken the case for KK.

Author's Profile

Cal Fawell
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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