Aspirational Affordances of AI

Abstract

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly permeate processes of cultural and epistemic production, there are growing concerns about how their outputs may confine individuals and groups to static or restricted narratives about who or what they could be. In this paper, we advance the discourse surrounding these concerns by making three contributions. First, we introduce the concept of aspirational affordance to describe how technologies of representation---paintings, literature, photographs, films, or video games---shape the exercising of imagination, particularly as it pertains to possibilities for agency. Second, we provide three reasons for scrutinizing of AI's influence on aspirational affordances: AI's influence is potentially more potent, but less public than traditional sources; AI's influence is not simply incremental, but ecological, transforming the entire landscape of cultural and epistemic practices that traditionally shaped aspirational affordances; and AI's influence is highly concentrated, with a few corporate-controlled systems mediating a growing portion of aspirational possibilities. Third, to advance such a scrutiny of AI's influence, we introduce the concept of aspirational harm, which arises when AI-generated affordances distort or diminish a group's hermeneutical resources for imagining their practical possibilities. Through three case studies, we illustrate how aspirational harms extend the existing discourse on AI-inflicted harms beyond representational and allocative harms, warranting separate attention. Through these conceptual resources and analyses, this paper advances understanding of the psychological and societal stakes of AI’s role in shaping individual and collective aspirations.

Author Profiles

Sina Fazelpour
Northeastern University
Meica Magnani
Harvard University

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2025-02-18

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