In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 (1):1-8 (2018)
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Abstract
A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.
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Archival date: 2019-03-26
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2018-06-09

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