In the interest of saving time: a critique of discrete perception

Neuroscience of Consciousness 2018 (1):1-8 (2018)
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Abstract

A recently proposed model of sensory processing suggests that perceptual experience is updated in discrete steps. We show that the data advanced to support discrete perception are in fact compatible with a continuous account of perception. Physiological and psychophysical constraints, moreover, as well as our awake-primate imaging data, imply that human neuronal networks cannot support discrete updates of perceptual content at the maximal update rates consistent with phenomenology. A more comprehensive approach to understanding the physiology of perception (and experience at large) is therefore called for, and we briefly outline our take on the problem.

Author Profiles

Sander Van de Cruys
University of Antwerp
Tomer Fekete
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

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