In E. Lepore & Kirk Ludwig (eds.), A Companion to Donald Davidson. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 75-89 (2013)
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This chapter presents Davidson’s account of intentional action and intention. Davidson initially discusses intentional action in relation to the explanation and the ontology of action. His earlier view equates acting intentionally with being caused to act by a pair of appropriately related mental states (a pro-attitude and an instrumental belief) and denies the existence of intentions as distinct mental states. Later, in his account of weakness of will, Davidson offers a more complex account of practical deliberation in terms of evaluative judgments. Finally, in "Intending", Davidson discusses intentions for future action and argues that intentions are all-out evaluative judgments, reversing his earlier position about the non-existence of intentions as distinct and irreducible mental states.
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