Inner Speech and Metacognition: a defense of the commitment-based approach

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of this paper is to present two problems to this view (section 3) and offer an alternative view to the connection between inner speech and metacognition (section 4). According to this alternative, inner speech (meta)cognitive functions derivate from the set of commitments we mobilize in our communicative exchanges. After presenting this commitment-based approach, I address two possible objections (section 5).
ISBN(s)
2069-0533
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FERISA-7
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-10-24
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-10-24

Total views
87 ( #42,376 of 58,223 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #35,762 of 58,223 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.