The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how the cognitive sciences are actually integrating mind and matter.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FIGTFO-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-01-24
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-01-24

Total views
419 ( #11,723 of 54,458 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
181 ( #2,469 of 54,458 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.