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  1. added 2019-01-30
    Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 2nd Edition Feb 2018.Michael Starks - 2016 - Las Vegas, USA: Reality Press.
    This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2019). All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it (...)
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  2. added 2019-01-24
    The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31:41-56.
    A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how (...)
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  3. added 2018-10-19
    The "Artificial Mathematician" Objection: Exploring the (Im)Possibility of Automating Mathematical Understanding.Sven Delarivière & Bart Van Kerkhove - 2017 - In B. Sriraman (ed.), Humanizing Mathematics and its Philosophy. Cham: Birkhäuser. pp. 173-198.
    Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer.
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  4. added 2018-10-04
    The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation in Its Place.Daniel D. Hutto, Erik Myin, Anco Peeters & Farid Zahnoun - 2018 - In Mark Sprevak & Matteo Colombo (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. London: Routledge. pp. 272-282.
    The mainstream view in cognitive science is that computation lies at the basis of and explains cognition. Our analysis reveals that there is no compelling evidence or argument for thinking that brains compute. It makes the case for inverting the explanatory order proposed by the computational basis of cognition thesis. We give reasons to reverse the polarity of standard thinking on this topic, and ask how it is possible that computation, natural and artificial, might be based on cognition and not (...)
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  5. added 2018-09-16
    Pluralität der Erfahrung Als Anthropologische Bestimmung.Gregor Schiemann - 2012 - In M. Wunsch (ed.), Von Hegel zur philosophischen Anthropologie. Königshausen & Neumann.
    Als Vertreter der historischen Anthropologie hat Christoph Wulf die philosophische Anthropologie von Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner und Arnold Gehlen kritisiert: Mit ihrem Interesse an einer einheitlichen Bestimmung des Menschen entgehe ihr die Pluralität von menschlichen Kulturen. Meiner Auffassung nach stellt diese Kritik für die philosophische Lehre vom Menschen eine Herausforderung dar (1.). Um ihr zu begegnen, möchte ich prüfen, ob Ernst Cassirers Kulturphilosophie die Vielfalt menschlicher Erfahrungsweisen angemessener berücksichtigt. Dass dies nicht in hinreichendem Umfang der Fall ist, lässt sich auf (...)
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  6. added 2018-08-05
    7. Subjektivierung der Erfahrung. Zu Deweys Rekonstruktion der Subjektivität.Jörg Volbers - 2017 - In Michael Hampe (ed.), John Dewey: Erfahrung Und Natur. De Gruyter. pp. 97-112.
    The article offers a close reading of chapter 6 of Dewey's 'Experience and Nature'. It explains how Dewey reformulates the classical notion of the subject in pragmatist terms, emphasizing in particular Dewey's idea that 'experience' is not a priori subjective, but rather has to be appropriated by the acting individual in order to become one's own experience in an emphatic sense.
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  7. added 2018-08-02
    Consciousness and Memory: A Transactional Approach.Carlos Montemayor - 2018 - Essays in Philosophy 19 (2).
    The prevailing view about our memory skills is that they serve a complex epistemic function. I shall call this the “monistic view.” Instead of a monistic, exclusively epistemic approach, I propose a transactional view. On this approach, autobiographical memory is irreducible to the epistemic functions of episodic memory because of its essentially moral and empathic character. I argue that this transactional view provides a more plausible and integral account of memory capacities in humans, based on theoretical and empirical reasons. Memory, (...)
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  8. added 2018-07-19
    Anna-Maria C. Bartsch: Form Und Formalismus. Stationen der Ästhetik Bei Baumgarten, Kant Und Zimmermann, Würzburg 2017. [REVIEW]Martina Sauer - 2018 - Sehepunkte. Rezensionsjournal für Geschichtswissenschaften 18 (7/8).
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  9. added 2018-05-27
    Sensorimotor Theory, Cognitive Access and the ‘Absolute’ Explanatory Gap.Victor Loughlin - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):611-627.
    Sensorimotor Theory is the claim that it is our practical know-how of the relations between our environments and us that gives our environmental interactions their experiential qualities. Yet why should such interactions involve or be accompanied by experience? This is the ‘absolute’ gap question. Some proponents of SMT answer this question by arguing that our interactions with an environment involve experience when we cognitively access those interactions. In this paper, I aim to persuade proponents of SMT to accept the following (...)
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  10. added 2018-03-22
    Extended Mind, Extended Conscious Mind, Enactivism.Victor Loughlin - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Antwerp
    In my thesis, I examined the theories of Extended Mind, Extended Conscious Mind and Enactivism. Briefly, Extended Mind (Clark and Chalmers, 1998) is the claim that objects in the environment can, on occasion, form part of your mental processing. Extended Conscious Mind (Clark, 2009; Ward, 2012) is the claim that environmental objects can, on occasion, also form part of your conscious experience. Enactivism (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991) is the claim that mind and experience are constituted by bodily actions. I (...)
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  11. added 2018-03-12
    Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980.Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. New York: Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  12. added 2018-03-05
    Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity: An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit.Willem A. DeVries - 1988 - Cornell University Press.
    An interpretation of Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit showing its continued relevance to contemporary issues in the philosophy of mind.
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  13. added 2018-02-16
    The Philosophy of Autism.Jami L. Anderson & Simon Cushing (eds.) - 2012 - Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
    This book examines autism from the tradition of analytic philosophy, working from the premise that Autism Spectrum Disorders raise interesting philosophical questions that need to be and can be addressed in a manner that is clear, jargon-free, and accessible. The goal of the original essays in this book is to provide a philosophically rich analysis of issues raised by autism and to afford dignity and respect to those impacted by autism by placing it at the center of the discussion.
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  14. added 2018-02-02
    The Elements of Emotion.Chad Brockman - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):163-186.
    I join the growing ranks of theorists who reject the terms of traditional debates about the nature of emotion, debates that have long focused on the question of whether emotions should be understood as either cognitive or somatic kinds of states. Here, I propose and defend a way of incorporating both into a single theory, which I label the “Integrated Representational Theory” of emotion. In Section 2 I begin to construct the theory, defining and explaining emotions in terms of three (...)
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  15. added 2017-12-23
    Markus Gabriel’s New Book (2017) with INCREDIBLE Similar Ideas to My Ideas (2002-2008) Regarding the Mind-Body Problem.Gabriel Vacariu - 2017 - Dissertation, Bucharest University
    It is well-known the UNBELIEVABLE similarities between markus gabriel’s ideas from his book 2013 and my ideas (2002, 2005, 2008, etc.) (see my article or my manuscript). Not amazing, markus gabriel (mg) publishes (2017) more UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas (2002, 2005, 2008)! So, let me investigate mg’s ideas from his last book 2017: -/- Markus Gabriel (2017) I am not a brain. Philosophy of Mind for the Twenty-First Century, Polity Press -/- I draw the attention that markus gabriel (...)
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  16. added 2017-12-20
    Fundamental Hope and Practical Identity.Claudia Blöser & Titus Stahl - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (3):345–371.
    This article considers the question ‘What makes hope rational?’ We take Adrienne Martin’s recent incorporation analysis of hope as representative of a tradition that views the rationality of hope as a matter of instrumental reasons. Against this tradition, we argue that an important subset of hope, ‘fundamental hope’, is not governed by instrumental rationality. Rather, people have reason to endorse or reject such hope in virtue of the contribution of the relevant attitudes to the integrity of their practical identity, which (...)
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  17. added 2017-10-08
    A questão do livre-arbítrio em John R. Searle: uma contraposição do naturalismo biológico ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2015 - Cognitio-Estudos 12 (2):179-190.
    This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism – particularly the computacionalist line – with the biological naturalism of John Searle regarding the possibility of free will. In such contrast, each line is decomposed into its statements so that they can be reviewed. It is argued that the searlean biological naturalism can explain more than the other two philosophies on how free action can have the source of its motivation in what is external to the mental state that makes (...)
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  18. added 2017-09-23
    Book Review Of: H. Gardner, The Mind's New Science. [REVIEW]Gary James Jason - 1987 - Philosophia 17 (2).
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  19. added 2017-09-11
    Content, Object, and Phenomenal Character.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2012 - Principia, an International Journal of Epistemology 16 (3):417-449.
    The view that perceptual experience has representational content, or the content view, has recently been criticized by the defenders of the so-called object view. Part of the dispute, I claim here, is based on a lack of grasp of the notion of content. There is, however, a core of substantial disagreement. Once the substantial core is revealed, I aim to: (1) reject the arguments raised against the content view by Campbell (2002), Travis (2004), and Brewer (2006); (2) criticize Brewer’s (2006, (...)
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  20. added 2017-09-03
    Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism.Dr Sanjit Chakraborty - 2016 - London, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
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  21. added 2017-08-23
    Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon‐Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.
    Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive (...)
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  22. added 2017-06-22
    Where Does Awareness Dawn? [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1997 - New Scientist (2105):48.
    JOHN SEARLE is clear, challenging and profound, and his book The Mystery of Consciousness reflects its author. It offers an engaging debate between Searle and David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Roger Penrose and Israel Rosenfield. Searle also touches on the work of Gerald Edelman and Francis Crick. Yet Searle does not always hit the target. For example, he confuses giving an explanation with giving an ultimate explanation in criticising Edelman's reentry mapping.
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  23. added 2017-05-04
    Psychology, Personal and Subpersonal.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Explanations in psychology are described as personal when they attribute psychological phenomena to the person, as when we attribute beliefs and thought processes to each other, for example. By contrast, explanations in psychology are described as subpersonal when they attribute psychological phenomena below the level of the person, as occurs when scientists describe parts of the brain as representing or evaluating, for example. The practice of subpersonal psychology raises a number of philosophical issues: whether it is acceptable to attribute psychological (...)
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  24. added 2017-04-13
    John Searle. Mind: A Brief Introduction. [REVIEW]Rodrigo González - 2006 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 62:171-173.
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  25. added 2017-04-12
    ¿Importa la Determinación Del Sexo En El Test de Turing?R. González - 2015 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 27 (40):277-295.
    Según la versión estándar del juego de la imitación, la determinación del sexo de los participantes no desempeña ningún papel en el testeo de la inteligencia de máquina. Desafortunadamente, tal simplificación soslaya la teoría de la mente que fundamenta dicho juego. Teniendo en consideración este problema, en este ensayo argumento en contra de la simplificación del Test de Turing. En efecto, tal como sostengo, la determinación del sexo de los participantes no debe obviarse: la mente de una mujer y su (...)
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  26. added 2017-04-08
    The Minimal Self Needs a Social Update.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (7):1057-1065.
    REVIEW ESSAY The minimal self needs a social update Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame, by Dan Zahavi, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 304 pp.
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  27. added 2017-03-15
    Review of The Myth of the Framework and Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem. [REVIEW]Ray Scott Percival - 1997 - New Scientist (10th Dec).
    The myth of the framework, as Popper explains it, is the idea that a rational and fruitful discussion is impossible unless the participants share a common framework of basic assumptions or, at least, unless they have agreed on such a framework for the purposes of the discussion. Popper admits that understanding another mind or language max' be difficult, but if there is a desire to understand another person's aims and problems you can bridge the gap.
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  28. added 2017-03-07
    Reassessing the Nature of IS.David Kreps - 2016 - AIS Electronic Library.
    This paper draws upon the work of three different philosophers, from America (Thomas Nagel), France (Henri Bergson) and Britain (Alfred North Whitehead), to argue for (i) the reality of subjectivity, (ii) the nonphysical nature of subjective consciousness that is dependent upon but not determined by the physical nature of the body, and (iii) the potential unity of a new concept of nature-on-the-move, as distinct from the bifurcation of nature that views only the objective as real. It then presents arguments for (...)
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  29. added 2017-01-29
    Review: Karel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic. [REVIEW]William J. Rapaport - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1):248-252.
    Review of Karel Lambert, Meinong and the Principle of Independence: Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical Logic.
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  30. added 2017-01-22
    How to Teach Philosophy of Mind.Renée Smith - 2016 - Teaching Philosophy 39 (2):177-207.
    The most notable contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind have been written by philosophers of mind for philosophers of mind. Without a good understanding of the historical framework, the technical terminology, the philosophical methodology, and the nature of the philosophical problems themselves, not only do undergraduate students face a difficult challenge when taking a first course in philosophy of mind, but instructors lacking specialized knowledge in this field might be put off from teaching the course. This paper is intended to (...)
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  31. added 2017-01-19
    Leonard Cohen and Philosophy: Various Positions. [REVIEW]Montgomery David - 2016 - CAML Review/Revue de L'ACBM 44 (2):57-61.
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  32. added 2017-01-03
    A teoria hegeliana da imaginação.Hector Ferreiro - 2016 - Ágora Filosófica 16 (1):139-154.
    No processo do conhecimento a imaginação desempenha para Hegel o estágio no qual a mente humana dissocia o objeto em dois diferentes conteúdos, o conteúdo-coisa do mundo externo e o conteúdo interno da própria mente, de tal modo que ambas as versões do mesmo devem corroborar-se mutuamemente ao modo de uma síntese simples de elementos heterogéneos que apenas em seu cotejamento reconhecem sua identidade. Na atividade de compreensão, ao contrário, este dualismo é suprassumido e, com ele, o empirismo e a (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    The Mind of the Lord and the Cosmos.G. B. James Lascelles - manuscript
    Instead of the usual dialectics that have now become very familiar to the evolution vs creation polemic, this article examines the different views rationally by adopting an eclectic approach that peruses evidence from secular history, cosmology, existential philosophy, systematic theology, and Biblical manuscripts in order to better understand the mind of God and the cosmos.
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  34. added 2016-12-08
    Subject‐Relative Reasons for Love.Hichem Naar - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):197-214.
    Can love be an appropriate response to a person? In this paper, I argue that it can. First, I discuss the reasons why we might think this question should be answered in the negative. This will help us clarify the question itself. Then I argue that, even though extant accounts of reasons for love are inadequate, there remains the suspicion that there must be something about people which make our love for them appropriate. Being lovable, I contend, is what makes (...)
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  35. added 2016-12-08
    Is Cognition an Attribute of the Self or It Rather Belongs to the Body? Some Dialectical Considerations on Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa’s Position Against Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika.Krishna Del Toso - 2011 - Open Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):48.
    In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...)
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  36. added 2016-11-25
    Attention and the Evolution of Intentional Communication.Ingar Brinck - 2001 - Pragmatics and Cognition 9 (2):259-277.
    Intentional communication is perceptually based and about attentional objects. Three attention mechanisms are distinguished: scanning, attention attraction, and attention-focusing. Attention-focusing directs the subject towards attentional objects. Attention-focusing is goal-governed (controlled by stimulus) or goal-intended (under the control of the subject). Attentional objects are perceptually categorised functional entities that emerge in the interaction between subjects and environment. Joint attention allows for focusing on the same attentional object simultaneously (mutual object-focused attention), provided that the subjects have focused on each other beforehand (subject-subject (...)
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  37. added 2016-11-22
    Value First: Comments on Mohan Matthen’s ‘The Pleasure of Art’.Keren Gorodeisky - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (1):79-84.
    While I welcome Mohan Matthen’s insistence that art is connected to aesthetic pleasure, I worry about his commitment to viewing pleasure as prior to, and constitutive of, the value of art. I raise my reservations by (i) dispelling his criticism of the reversed explanatory direction, and (ii) showing problems for his commitment. As an alternative, I offer an account of pleasure that explains it in terms of the independent value of art—an account that is free of the problems Matthen raises (...)
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  38. added 2016-09-02
    Attention in Bodily Awareness.Gregor Hochstetter - 2016 - Synthese 193 (12):3819-3842.
    The aim of this paper is to develop and defend an Attentional View of bodily awareness, on which attention is necessary for bodily awareness. The original formulation of the Attentional View is due to Marcel Kinsbourne. First, I will show that the Attentional View of bodily awareness as formulated by Kinsbourne is superior to other accounts in the literature for characterizing the relationship between attention and bodily awareness. Kinsbourne’s account is the only account in the literature so far which can (...)
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  39. added 2016-08-31
    Mindvaults: Sociocultural Grounds for Pretending and Imagining, by Radu J. Bogdan. [REVIEW]Carrie Figdor - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1235-1240.
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  40. added 2016-07-11
    To Believe is to Know That You Believe.Eric Marcus - 2016 - Dialectica 70 (3):375-405.
    Most agree that believing a proposition normally or ideally results in believing that one believes it, at least if one considers the question of whether one believes it. I defend a much stronger thesis. It is impossible to believe without knowledge of one's belief. I argue, roughly, as follows. Believing that p entails that one is able to honestly assert that p. But anyone who is able to honestly assert that p is also able to just say – i.e., authoritatively, (...)
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  41. added 2016-05-30
    Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self.Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? (...)
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  42. added 2016-04-18
    Kant on de Re. Some Aspects of the Kantian Non-Conceptualism Debate.Luca Forgione - 2015 - Kant Studies Online (1):32-64.
    In recent years non-conceptual content theorists have taken Kant as a reference point on account of his notion of intuition (§§ 1-2). The present work aims at exploring several complementary issues intertwined with the notion of non-conceptual content: of these, the first concerns the role of the intuition as an indexical representation (§ 3), whereas the second applies to the presence of a few epistemic features articulated according to the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description (§ 4). (...)
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  43. added 2016-04-18
    Kant and the I as Subject.Luca Forgione - 2013 - In Margit Ruffing, Claudio La Rocca, Alfredo Ferrarin & Stefano Bacin (eds.), Kant Und Die Philosophie in Weltbürgerlicher Absicht: Akten des Xi. Kant-Kongresses 2010. De Gruyter. pp. 117-128.
    In the last few years, various Kantian commentators have drawn attention on a number of features in the self-reference device of transcendental apperception having emerged from the contemporary debate on the irreducibility of self-ascription of thoughts in the first person. Known as I-thoughts, these have suggested a connection between some aspects of Kant’s philosophy and Wittgenstein’s philosophico-linguistic analysis of the grammatical rule of the term I. This paper would like to review some of such correspondences (§§ 1-3), avoiding any mechanical (...)
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  44. added 2016-04-18
    La Forma Vuota dell'Io. Kant E l'Autoriferimento Del Soggetto Autocosciente.Luca Forgione - 2010 - In Gian Pietro Storari & Elisabetta Gola (eds.), Forme e formalizzazioni. Atti del 16º Congresso Nazionale della Società di Filosofia del Linguaggio. Cagliari, 10-12 settembre 2009. Cuec Editrice.
    Presupponendo l’influenza di alcune tesi dell’idealismo di Kant su alcune tesi di Wittgenstein non solo attraverso la lettura di Schopenhauer, questo contributo prova a ripercorrere alcune contiguità e differenze tra il dispositivo autoreferenziale dell’appercezione trascendentale e certi aspetti emersi dal dibattito contemporaneo sul carattere irriducibile dell’autoascrizione dei pensieri che contengono un riferimento in prima persona, i cosiddetti I-thoughts, dibattito ispirato da Wittgenstein e dalla sua analisi filosofico-linguistica della grammatica del termine “Io”.
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  45. added 2016-03-19
    Mobile Learning: Essays on Philosophy, Psychology and Education.Kristóf Nyíri (ed.) - 2003 - Passagen Verlag.
    The changing conditions for the accumulation and transmission of knowledge in the age of multimedia networks make it inevitable that old philosophical problems become formulated in a new light. Above all, the problem of the unity of knowledge is once again a topical issue. The situation-dependent acquisition of knowledge that is made possible by mobile learning transcends the boundaries of traditional disciplines, linking the domains of text, diagram, and picture. Database integration and multimedia search become central problems in the epistemology (...)
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  46. added 2016-03-16
    Swinburne on ‘Mental’ and ‘Physical’. Oppy - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (4):483-495.
    This paper examines Richard Swinburne's definitions of 'mental property' and 'physical property'. After some preliminary tidying up (Section 1), the paper introduces eight putative counter-examples to Swinburne's definitions (Section 2). The paper then considers amendments to Swinburne's account of 'mental property' (Section 3) and 'physical property' (Section 4) which deal with these counter-examples. Finally, the paper closes with some brief remarks about the metaphysics of properties (Appendix). Along the way, the paper provides various reasons for thinking that Swinburne's definitions are (...)
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  47. added 2016-02-28
    Extended Mind and Religious Cognition.Joel Krueger - 2016 - Religion: Mental Religion. Part of the Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Religion Series.
    The extended mind thesis claims that mental states need not be confined to the brain or even the biological borders of the subject. Philosophers and cognitive scientists have in recent years debated the plausibility of this thesis, growing an immense body of literature. Yet despite its many supporters, there have been relatively few attempts to apply the thesis to religious studies, particularly studies of religious cognition. In this essay, I indicate how various dimensions of religious cognition might be thought of (...)
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  48. added 2016-02-25
    Moving Beyond Mirroring - a Social Affordance Model of Sensorimotor Integration During Action Perception.Maria Brincker - 2010 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    The discovery of so-called ‘mirror neurons’ - found to respond both to own actions and the observation of similar actions performed by others - has been enormously influential in the cognitive sciences and beyond. Given the self-other symmetry these neurons have been hypothesized as underlying a ‘mirror mechanism’ that lets us share representations and thereby ground core social cognitive functions from intention understanding to linguistic abilities and empathy. I argue that mirror neurons are important for very different reasons. Rather than (...)
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  49. added 2015-11-05
    Trends in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Neuroscience.Juan José Sanguineti - 2015 - In P. A. Gargiulo H. L. Mesones (ed.), Psychiatry and Neuroscience. Bridging the Divide. Springer. pp. 23-37.
    This paper presents current trends in philosophy of mind and philosophy of neuroscience, with a special focus on neuroscientists dealing with some topics usually discussed by philosophers of mind. The aim is to detect the philosophical views of those scientists, such as Eccles, Gazzaniga, Damasio, Changeux, and others, which are not easy to classify according to the standard divisions of dualism, functionalism, emergentism, and others. As the variety of opinions in these fields is sometimes a source of confusion, it is (...)
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  50. added 2015-10-25
    Berkeley's Active Self.Jonathan Dancy - 2005 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1):5-20.
    The Author considers the strengths and weaknesses of Berkeley’s account of what he calls indifferently the soul, mind, spirit or self. Such an account deserves far more credit than he has standardly been awarded for a significantly modern position, most of which has mistakenly been credited to Schopenhauer. The Aauthor relates Berkeley’s views to those recently expressed by Bill Brewer and attempts to isolate the crucial difference between Berkeley and Schopenhauer.
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