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  1. Events to Dualism.Frank De Silva - manuscript
    Perception is a continuous experience that exists at every instant, across a set of simultaneous events in the brain. Special relativity physics states that there can be nothing physical, that connect simultaneous events. As such perception cannot be a physical but non- physical or dualistic. This argument is analysed further and a new concept called Concept A is introduce. With the aid of concept A, free will is explained.
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  2. Artificial Intelligence and Theory of Mind.David Matta - manuscript
    The essay explores the intersection of the Theory of Mind (T.O.M.) and Artificial Intelligence (AI), emphasizing the potential for AI to emulate cognitive processes fundamental to human social interactions. T.O.M., a concept crucial for understanding and interpreting human behavior through attributed mental states, contrasts with AI's behaviorist approach, which is rooted in data-driven pattern analysis and predictions. By examining foundational insights from cognitive sciences and the operational models of AI, this analysis highlights the potential advancements and implications of integrating T.O.M.-like (...)
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  3. The Logic of Qualia.Drew McDermott - manuscript
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of (...)
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  4. McTaggart saves Schrodinger's Cat?Paul Merriam - manuscript
    This paper proposes an interpretation of time that is an 'A-theory' in that it incorporates both McTaggart's A-series and his B-series. The A-series characteristics are supposed to be 'ontologically private' analogous to qualia in the Inverted Spectrum thought experiment and is given a definition. The main idea is that the experimenter and the cat do not share the same A-series characteristics. So there is no single time at which the cat gets ascribed different states. It is proposed one may define (...)
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  5. Postscripts.Paul Merriam - manuscript
    Postscripts to McTaggart meets Schrodinger's Cat.
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  6. Naturalism Meets the Personal Level: How Mixed Modelling Flattens the Mind.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    In this essay, it is argued that naturalism of an even moderate sort speaks strongly against a certain widely held thesis about the human mental (and cognitive) architecture: that it is divided into two distinct levels, the personal and the subpersonal, about the former of which we gain knowledge in a manner that effectively insulates such knowledge from the results of scientific research. -/- An empirically motivated alternative is proposed, according to which the architecture is, so to speak, flattened from (...)
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  7. On the notion of existence.Piotr Witas - manuscript
    I argue that a slight shift in our understanding of the notion of existence is needed in order to cope with the problem of external world and the problem of mind and body. As a consequence of it being taught by "givenness" of the subjective mind, and despite its applicability in objective contexts, it should be considered a "tool" akin to qualia, rather than pertaining to a "true", objective reality. In plain language, one's supposed relation with their surroundings is known (...)
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  8. Qualia and the Formal Structure of Meaning.Xerxes Arsiwalla - 2024
    This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", (...)
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  9. Yet Another Objection to Fading and Dancing Qualia.Nir Aides -
    In this paper I present objections to the Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia thought experiments, which David Chalmers uses to argue that functional organization fully determines conscious experience.
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  10. Situated Intelligence: An Introspective Model of Consciousness.Stephen G. Perrin -
    The model of consciousness developed here is a cooperative venture between mind, brain, body, nature, culture, community, and family. The overall unity of consciousness is provided by the loop of engagement that conducts intentional action into the ambient. Each successive round of engagement between subject and world generates a gap of disparity between remembrance of purpose or intent and the effect achieved on the operative level of understanding within a larger taxonomic scheme in experience. That gap sends a delta signal (...)
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  11. On perception and ontology in the context of subjectivity and modern physics.Piotr Witas -
    I argue that our direct experience and some physical facts do not go well with an understanding of perception as a mechanism producing a representation of a ''truly'' outer world. Instead, it is much more coherent to treat what is traditionally considered an image in this context as a closed structure equipped in its own ontology, replacing the ''truly'' outer one from the point of view of an agent possessing it. In such a framework, the notion of existence is taken (...)
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  12. Do Sensory Substitution Extend the Conscious Mind?Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina - forthcoming - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. John Benjamins.
    Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and (...)
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  13. Existential and Behavioral Senses of the Meta Problem.Aliakbar Kouchakzadeh & Shahriar Gharibzadeh - forthcoming - Advances in Cognitive Science.
    The meta problem can be seen in two different ways: a problem considering the existence of the hard problem, and a problem considering the behaviors related to expressing reports about the hard problem. The existential way of seeing is equivalent to the first approximation of the meta problem while Chalmers introduces it, and the behavioral way of seeing is equivalent to the second approximation. We are going to argue that these are two different problems and there are different solutions to (...)
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  14. Rationality and Acquaintance in Theories of Introspection.Daniel Stoljar - forthcoming - In Davide Bordini, Arnaud Dewalque & Anna Giustina (eds.), Consciousness and Inner Awareness. Cambridge University Press.
    Abstract: According to a rationalist theory of introspection, rational agents have a capacity to believe they are in conscious states when they are in them, much as they have the capacity, for example, to avoid obvious contradictions in their beliefs. For the agent to know or believe by introspection, on this view, is for them to exercise that capacity. According to an acquaintance theory of introspection, by contrast, whenever an agent is in a conscious state, the agent is aware of (...)
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  15. Imagining the Past of the Present.Mark Windsor - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Some objects we value because they afford a felt connection with people, events, or places connected with their past. Visiting Canterbury cathedral, you encounter the place where, in 1170, Archbishop Thomas Becket was murdered by four knights of Henry II. Knowing that you are standing in the very place where Becket’s blood was spilled gives the past event a sense of tangible reality. One feels ‘in touch with’ the past; history seems to ‘come alive’. In this paper, I propose an (...)
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  16. Helmuth Plessner's Schellingian Reconciliation of Idealism and Realism About the Psyche.Márton Dornbach - 2024 - Human Studies 2024 (N/A):1-34.
    While Schelling’s anticipation of Freudian psychoanalysis is well established, it has thus far gone unnoticed that Schelling’s ideas also proved fruitful in the context of a distinctively philosophical theory of the psyche developed by a younger contemporary of Freud. During the 1920s Helmuth Plessner, a key figure of philosophical anthropology, outlined a complex conception of the psyche as an individualized, inner region of reality. Although Plessner did not present his philosophical psychology in a systematic form, its building blocks can be (...)
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  17. Valent Representation: Problems and Prospects.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2024 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 5 (2):17-23.
    If emotion is not an arbitrary compilation of fixed types of (descriptive, conceptual, conative, prescriptive) content, nor a state that can be reduced to other types of pre-existing (perceptual, cognitive, behavioral) states, then what sort of thing is it really? Tom Cochrane has proposed that emotions are valent representations of situated concerns. Valent representation is a type of mental content whose function is to detect the presence or absence of certain conditions; what makes that type of content valent is that (...)
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  18. Daydreaming as spontaneous immersive imagination: A phenomenological analysis.Emily Lawson & Evan Thompson - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5 (1):1-34.
    Research on the specific features of daydreaming compared with mind-wandering and night dreaming is a neglected topic in the philosophy of mind and the cognitive neuroscience of spontaneous thought. The extant research either conflates daydreaming with mind-wandering (whether understood as task-unrelated thought, unguided attention, or disunified thought), characterizes daydreaming as opposed to mind-wandering (Dorsch, 2015), or takes daydreaming to encompass any and all “imagined events” (Newby-Clark & Thavendran, 2018). These dueling definitions obstruct future research on spontaneous thought, and are insufficiently (...)
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  19. The consequences of seeing imagination as a dual‐process virtue.Ingrid Malm Lindberg - 2024 - Metaphilosophy 55 (2):162-174.
    Michael T. Stuart (2021 and 2022) has proposed imagination as an intellectual dual‐process virtue, consisting of imagination1 (underwritten by cognitive Type 1 processing) and imagination2 (supported by Type 2 processing). This paper investigates the consequences of taking such an account seriously. It proposes that the dual‐process view of imagination allows us to incorporate recent insights from virtue epistemology, providing a fresh perspective on how imagination can be epistemically reliable. The argument centers on the distinction between General Reliability (GR) and Functional (...)
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  20. Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction.Mason Westfall - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):831-860.
    What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The things that (...)
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  21. The Absolute Primacy of the Intellect in Aquinas: A Reaction to Fabro’s Position.Andres Ayala - 2023 - The Incarnate Word 10 (2):41-122.
    St. Thomas Aquinas has always considered intelligence a potency higher than the will, absolutely speaking. That being said, and in my view, the existential primacy of the will in the act of freedom (particularly in choosing the existential end) is also indisputably Thomistic, as Cornelio Fabro has shown. This paper endeavors to explain Aquinas' doctrine on the absolute primacy of the intellect and thus show that these two primacies can be affirmed coherently, that is, the intellect’s absolute primacy and the (...)
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  22. Cognitive penetration and implicit cognition.Lucas Battich & Ophelia Deroy - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 144-152.
    Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. Second, the influencing state (...)
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  23. What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Cognition?: Human, cybernetic, and phylogenetic conceptual schemes.Carrie Figdor - 2023 - JOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 4 (2):149-162.
    This paper outlines three broad conceptual schemes currently in play in the sciences concerned with explaining cognitive abilities. One is the anthropocentric scheme – human cognition – that dominated our thinking about cognition until very recently. Another is the cybernetic-computational scheme – cybernetic cognition – rooted in cognitive science and flourishing in such fields as artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience, and biocybernetics. The third is an evolutionary biological scheme – phylogenetic cognition – that conceptualizes cognition in terms of the phylogeny-based approach (...)
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  24. Conwy Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936).Arran Gare - 2023 - The Whitehead Encyclopedia.
    Conwy Lloyd Morgan developed an evolutionary philosophy of nature that was a point of departure and major influence on philosophers in the 1920s. He both influenced and was influenced by Alfred North Whitehead. Following Henri Bergson, Lloyd Morgan argued for a place for emergence to supplement Darwin’s thesis of continuity in evolution, developing Herbert Spencer’s thesis that evolution proceeds from the inorganic to the organic to the super-organic, associated with mind and society. In doing so, Lloyd Morgan offered an event (...)
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  25. Humans in the meta-human era (Meta-philosophical analysis).Spyridon Kakos - 2023 - Harmonia Philosophica Papers.
    Humans are obsolete. In the post-ChatGPT era, artificial intelligence systems have replaced us in the last sectors of life that we thought were our personal kingdom. Yet, humans still have a place in this life. But they can find it only if they forget all those things that we believe make us unique. Only if we go back to doing nothing, can we truly be alive and meet our Self. Only if we stop thinking can we accept the Cosmos as (...)
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  26. Are Infants Conscious?Claudia Passos-Ferreira - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):308-329.
    I argue that newborn infants are conscious. I propose a methodology for investigating infant consciousness, and I present two approaches for determining whether newborns are conscious. First, I consider behavioral and neurobiological markers of consciousness. Second, I investigate the major theories of consciousness, including both philosophical and scientific theories, and I discuss what they predict about infant consciousness.
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  27. Conant, James and Chakraborty, Sanjit (eds.), Engaging Putnam. Berlin: De Gruyter 2022, pp. viii + 372. [REVIEW]Pietro Salis - 2023 - Argumenta (17):217-222.
    Review of the book "Engaging Putnam".
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  28. Hindu Nondual Philosophy, Spinoza, and the Mind-Body Problem.James H. Cumming - 2022 - Dogma: Revue de Philosophie Et de Sciences Humaines 19:20-48.
    This article is the SECOND of several excerpts from my book The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (the full book is posted on this site). “I liked James H. Cumming’s The Nondual Mind a lot. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and very clear.” (Prof. Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University) “James H. Cumming’s scholarly interpretation of Spinoza’s works, persuasively showing how 17th century European ideas that ushered in the Enlightenment find a precursor (...)
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  29. The Nondual Mind.James H. Cumming - 2022 - Dogma: Revue de Philosophie Et de Sciences Humaines 18:19-34.
    This article is the FIRST of several excerpts from my book The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (the full book is posted on this site). “I liked James H. Cumming’s The Nondual Mind a lot. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and very clear.” (Prof. Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University) “James H. Cumming’s scholarly interpretation of Spinoza’s works, persuasively showing how 17th century European ideas that ushered in the Enlightenment find a precursor (...)
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  30. Consciousness Explained?James H. Cumming - 2022 - Dogma: Revue de Philosophie Et de Sciences Humaines 20:62-74.
    This article is the THIRD of several excerpts from my book The Nondual Mind: Vedānta, Kashmiri Pratyabhijñā Shaivism, and Spinoza (the full book is posted on this site). “I liked James H. Cumming’s The Nondual Mind a lot. It is beautifully written, thoughtful, and very clear.” (Prof. Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Charlotte Bloomberg Professor of Philosophy, Johns Hopkins University) “James H. Cumming’s scholarly interpretation of Spinoza’s works, persuasively showing how 17th century European ideas that ushered in the Enlightenment find a precursor (...)
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  31. Games: Agency as Art. By C. THI NGUYEN. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. viii + 244. Price £22.99, US $35.00.). [REVIEW]Trystan S. Goetze - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):240-243.
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  32. Trading on Identity and Singular Thought.Rachel Goodman - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):296-312.
    On the traditional relationalist conception of singular thought, a thought has singular content when it is based on an ‘information relation’ to its object. Recent work rejects relationalism and suggests singular thoughts are distinguished from descriptive thoughts by their inferential role: only thoughts with singular content can be employed in ‘direct’ inferences, or inferences that ‘trade on identity’. Firstly this view is insufficiently clear, because it conflates two distinct ideas—one about a kind of inference, the other a kind of process (...)
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  33. Nature of Human Reports and Possible Hardness of the Meta Problem.Aliakbar Kouchakzadeh & Shahriar Gharibzadeh - 2022 - The Science of Consciousness 2022 [Book of Abstracts].
    The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining subjective experience. This problem is based on the notion that explaining brain functions cannot lead to explaining experience (Chalmers, 1995). The meta problem of consciousness is the problem that why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers suggests that solving the meta problem deals with human reports of the hard problem- named problem reports. He notes that since problem reports are facts of human behavior we can (...)
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  34. On the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination.Kengo Miyazono & Uku Tooming - 2022 - In Anja Berninger & Íngrid Vendrell Ferran (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives on Memory and Imagination. London: Routledge. pp. 127-145.
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  35. Towards a Neutral-Structuralist Theory of Consciousness and Selfhood.Janko Nešić - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 35 (3):243-259.
    Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni, M. D. 2019. Structuring the Self, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni’s structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the (...)
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  36. The given and the hard problem of content.Pietro Salis - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-26.
    Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...)
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  37. The pragmatic approach to fictive utterances and its consequences for mental fictionalism.János Tőzsér & Miklós Márton - 2022 - In Tamás Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations. New York & London: Routledge. pp. 199-213.
    This chapter has three aims. Firstly, it elaborates the so-called pragmatic approach to fictionalism. By evoking some classical pragmatic theories of fictive utterances, it gives an account of pragmatic properties responsible for the difference between serious and fictive utterances. The authors argue for the thesis that the pragmatic approach can be applied plausibly to all kinds of fictionalism, that is from instrumentalism to figuralism. Secondly, the authors investigate some consequences of the suggested account for fictionalist theories in general. They show (...)
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  38. The Self-Field: Mind, Body and Environment.Chris Abel - 2021 - Oxford: Routledge.
    In this incisive study of the biological and cultural origins of the human self, the author challenges readers to re-think ideas about the self and consciousness as being exclusive to humans. In their place, he expounds a metatheoretical approach to the self as a purposeful system of extended cognition common to animal life: the invisible medium maintaining mind, body and environment as an integrated 'field of being'. Supported by recent research in evolutionary and developmental studies together with related discoveries in (...)
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  39. Intentional mind-wandering as intentional omission: the surrealist method.Santiago Arango-Muñoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7727-7748.
    Mind-wandering seems to be paradigmatically unintentional. However, experimental findings have yielded the paradoxical result that mind-wandering can also be intentional. In this paper, we first present the paradox of intentional mind-wandering and then explain intentional mind-wandering as the intentional omission to control one’s own thoughts. Finally, we present the surrealist method for artistic production to illustrate how intentional omission of control over thoughts can be deployed towards creative endeavors.
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  40. From Logical to Existing issue 20210210.Jean-Louis Boucon - 2021 - Academia.
    For the OK, there is in fact no opposition between the logical and the material or the spiritual: reality is a formless logical substance. Representation is morphogenesis and the terms 'material' and 'spiritual' only denote categories of morphogenesis. Our constant experience shows us that spiritual and material interact. The border between understanding and becoming, between meaning and act, which seems trivial to us, is elusive when we try to approach it. For example: when the subject follows the object of his (...)
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  41. How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.
    Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...)
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  42. Reading (with) Others.Wolfgang Huemer - 2021 - In Sonia Sedivy (ed.), Art, Representation, and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York: Routledge.
    Kendall Walton’s account of make-believe takes the social dimension of imagination into account. In this paper I aim to extend this suggestion and argue that works of fiction allow for encounters with concrete (yet fictitious) persons with a distinct point of view and a discernible perspective. These encounters allow us to contrast the perspective(s) that emerge from the work with one’s own. I will then discuss two moments of the social dimension: imagining fictional scenarios is a social practice, a game (...)
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  43. Are Rules of Inference Superfluous? Wittgenstein vs. Frege and Russell.Gilad Nir - 2021 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):45-61.
    In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated (...)
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  44. Philosophy of Modeling in the 1870s: A Tribute to Hans Vaihinger.Karlis Podnieks - 2021 - Baltic Journal of Modern Computing 9 (1):67-110.
    This paper contains a detailed exposition and analysis of The Philosophy of “As If“ proposed by Hans Vaihinger in his book published in 1911. However, the principal chapters of the book (Part I) reproduce Vaihinger’s Habilitationsschrift, which was written during the autumn and winter of 1876. Part I is extended by Part II based on texts written during 1877–1878, when Vaihinger began preparing the book. The project was interrupted, resuming only in the 1900s. My conclusion is based exclusively on the (...)
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  45. Reduction and Reflection after the Analytic-Continental Divide.Jacob Rump - 2021 - In Hanne Jacobs (ed.), The Husserlian Mind. Routledge. pp. 117-28.
    In this chapter, I discuss some lesser-known aspects of Husserl’s concept of the phenomenological reduction in relation to his use of the notion of reflection, and indicate how these topics connect to concerns in contemporary philosophy after the analytic-continental divide. Empathy, collective intentionality, non-representationalism, non-cognitivism, and the focus on the lived body as a source of sense-making and knowing-how are all domains in which Husserl’s conception of the reduction anticipates recent philosophical trends after the analytic-continental divide. They are also interconnected (...)
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  46. PARA ALÉM DAS QUANTIDADES: Uma abordagem em favor da irredutibilidade da mente.Maurício Vieira Tenório - 2021 - Dissertation, Unirio
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  47. A sketch of a Kripkean theory of consciousnes.Federico Zilio - 2021 - Universa. Recensioni di Filosofia 10 (3):273-292.
    In this paper, I will propose a provisional blueprint of the notion of consciousness. I will start an analysis of the notion from the way we generally use the term “consciousness” in our ordinary language. In this regard, I will use Saul Kripke’s direct reference theory to define the term “consciousness” in a non-descriptive way, that is, interpreting it as a rigid designator. Then, I will critically discuss the idea of a necessary a posteriori relationship between consciousness and brain activity, (...)
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  48. Pain, Amnesia, and Qualitative Memory: Conceptual and Empirical Challenges.Sabrina Coninx - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (11-12):126-133.
    Barbara Montero considers whether or not we are able to remember what pain feels like. In order to properly answer this question, she introduces a new type of memory called 'qualitative memory', which seems common to exteroceptive sensations. Having concluded that there is arguably no qualitative memory for pain and other bodily sensations, Montero considers possible philosophical implications for areas including rational choice-making and empathy. In addressing the relationship between pain and memory, the paper raises an issue that has not (...)
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  49. Is boredom one or many? A functional solution to the problem of heterogeneity.Andreas Elpidorou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):491-511.
    Despite great progress in our theoretical and empirical investigations of boredom, a basic issue regarding boredom remains unresolved: it is still unclear whether the construct of boredom is a unitary one or not. By surveying the relevant literature on boredom and arousal, the paper makes a case for the unity of the construct of boredom. It argues, first, that extant empirical findings do not support the heterogeneity of boredom, and, second, that a theoretically motivated and empirically grounded model of boredom (...)
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  50. Love and Power: Grau and Pury (2014) as a Case Study in the Challenges of X-Phi Replication.Edouard Machery, Christopher Grau & Cynthia L. Pury - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (4):1-17.
    Grau and Pury (Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 155–168, 2014) reported that people’s views about love are related to their views about reference. This surprising effect was however not replicated in Cova et al.’s (in press) replication study. In this article, we show that the replication failure is probably due to the replication’s low power and that a metaanalytic reanalysis of the result in Cova et al. suggests that the effect reported in Grau and Pury is real. We then (...)
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