Abstract entities in a presentist world

Metaphysica 17 (2):177-193 (2016)
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Abstract
How can a metaphysics of abstract entities be built upon a metaphysics of time? In this paper, I address the question of how to accommodate abstract entities in a presentist world. I consider both the traditional metaontological approach of unrestricted fundamental quantification and then ontological pluralism. I argue that under the former we need to impose two constraints in the characterization of presentism in order to avoid undesired commitments to abstract entities: we have to characterize presentism as a thesis only about the concrete, and we also need to avoid the widely held distinction between tensed and tenseless senses of existence. Under ontological pluralism, instead, I argue that we can naturally accommodate any view of abstract objects in a presentist world.
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Archival date: 2018-02-16
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References found in this work BETA
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Williamson, Timothy
.Williamson, Timothy
Truth and Ontology.Merricks, Trenton

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2016-06-30

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