A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'

Erkenntnis (4):909-941 (2014)
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Abstract
The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence
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References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.Lewis, David K.
The Moral Problem.Smith, Michael
Morals by Agreement.Gauthier, David

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Enkrasia.Broome, John

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