A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'

Erkenntnis (4):909-941 (2014)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The requirements of rationality are fundamental in practical and theoretical philosophy. Nonetheless, there exists no correct account of what constitutes rational requirements. This paper attempts to provide a correct constitutive account of ‘rationality requires’. I argue that rational requirements are grounded in ‘necessary explanations of subjective incoherence’, as I shall put it. Rationality requires of you to X if and only if your rational capacities, in conjunction with the fact that you not-X, explain necessarily why you have a non-maximal degree of subjective coherence
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-10-28
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
572 ( #11,150 of 65,546 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
55 ( #14,928 of 65,546 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.