The Function of Normative Process‐Requirements

Dialectica 66 (1):115-136 (2012)
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This paper discusses whether rationality, morality or prudence impose process‐requirements upon us. It has been argued that process‐requirements fulfil two essential functions within a system of rational, moral or prudential requirements. These functions are considered to prove the existence of process‐requirements. First, process‐requirements are deemed necessary to ensure that rationality, morality or prudence can guide our deliberations and actions. Second, their existence is regarded as essential for the correctness of our ordinary explanations of why a person possesses a certain degree of morality, rationality or prudence. However, I argue that these two functions are unable to show the existence of process‐requirements. Instead, I propose a different essential function for process‐requirements: they are necessary for attributing the correct degree of rationality, morality or prudence to a subject who is not entirely rational, moral or prudent. This function, I argue, necessitates the existence of process‐requirements.
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Why Be Rational.Kolodny, Niko
Philosophical investigations.Wittgenstein, Ludwig & Anscombe, G. E. M.

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