Does the consequence argument beg the question?

Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature of begging the question. Although the charge of begging the question is frequently made in philosophy, it is surprisingly difficult to pin down the precise nature of this dialectical infelicity (or family of such infelicities). Thus we offer some new proposals about the nature of begging the question with an eye to understanding what is going on in central cases in which the charge is legitimately made. We then defend the Consequence Argument against the charge that it begs the question, so construed. We contend that, whatever the other liabilities of the argument may be, it does not beg the question against the compatibilist
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FISDTC
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-11-07
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-11-30

Total views
397 ( #11,193 of 51,339 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
52 ( #10,420 of 51,339 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.