Libet-style experiments, neuroscience, and libertarian free will

Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is argued that neuroscience and psychology could in principle provide support for milder deterministic claims that would also conflict with libertarian free will. Second, it is argued that Libet-style experiments—due to some of their peculiar features, ones that need not be shared by neuroscience as a whole—currently do not support such less demanding deterministic claims. The general result is that neuroscience and psychology could in principle...
PhilPapers/Archive ID
FISLEN
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-10-24
View other versions
Added to PP index
2016-03-29

Total views
470 ( #13,768 of 64,072 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #14,944 of 64,072 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.