Priority monism, partiality, and minimal truthmakers

Philosophical Studies 172 (2):477-491 (2015)
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Abstract
Truthmaker monism is the view that the one and only truthmaker is the world. Despite its unpopularity, this view has recently received an admirable defence by Schaffer :307–324, 2010b). Its main defect, I argue, is that it omits partial truthmakers. If we omit partial truthmakers, we lose the intimate connection between a truth and its truthmaker. I further argue that the notion of a minimal truthmaker should be the key notion that plays the role of constraining ontology and that truthmaker monism is not necessary for an appropriate solution to the problem of finding truthmakers for negative truths. I conclude that we should reject truthmaker monism once and for all.
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Archival date: 2015-10-20
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Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.
On What Grounds What.Schaffer, Jonathan

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Minimal Truthmakers.O'conaill, Donnchadh & Tahko, Tuomas E.
Priority Monism.Trogdon, Kelly

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2014-03-27

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