Truthmaking and Fundamentality

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):448-473 (2016)
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I apply the notion of truthmaking to the topic of fundamentality by articulating a truthmaker theory of fundamentality according to which some truths are truth-grounded in certain entities while the ones that don't stand in a metaphysical-semantic relation to the truths that do. I motivate this view by critically discussing two problems with Ross Cameron's truthmaker theory of fundamentality. I then defend this view against Theodore Sider's objection that the truthmaking approach to fundamentality violates the purity constraint. Truthmaker theorists can have a trouble-free theory of fundamentality.

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A. R. J. Fisher
Gonzaga University


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