Truthmaking and Fundamentality
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):448-473 (2016)
Abstract
I apply the notion of truthmaking to the topic of fundamentality by articulating a truthmaker theory of fundamentality according to which some truths are truth-grounded in certain entities while the ones that don't stand in a metaphysical-semantic relation to the truths that do. I motivate this view by critically discussing two problems with Ross Cameron's truthmaker theory of fundamentality. I then defend this view against Theodore Sider's objection that the truthmaking approach to fundamentality violates the purity constraint. Truthmaker theorists can have a trouble-free theory of fundamentality.
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2016
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Archival date: 2015-10-20
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2015-07-15
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2015-07-15
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436 ( #17,563 of 70,235 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #27,596 of 70,235 )
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