Philosophical Studies 170 (2):343-358 (2014)
AbstractChalmers (Mind 120(479): 587–636, 2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. In this paper, I review Chalmers’ arguments and give some responses on behalf of the referentialist
Archival historyFirst archival date: 2014-01-19
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