Raz on Practical Reason and Political Morality

Jurisprudence 8 (2):185-204 (2017)
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This article examines the relationship between Raz's theories of practical reason and political morality. Raz believes the former underpins the latter, when in fact it undermines it. This is because three core features of his theory of practical reason – desires, goals, and competitive pluralism––combine in such a way as to undermine a core feature of his theory of political morality––what Raz calls our autonomy-based duty to provide everyone with what he takes to be an adequate range of valuable life options. As it turns out, if we are reasonable, in terms of the former theory, then we are likely to be immoral, in terms of the latter one.
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