The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations

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Abstract
It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before considering in what sense such principles obtain of necessity.
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First archival date: 2019-01-07
Latest version: 3 (2019-09-24)
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2019-01-07

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