The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before considering in what sense such principles obtain of necessity.

Author Profiles

Olle Risberg
Uppsala University
Daniel Fogal
New York University


Added to PP

1,477 (#5,270)

6 months
177 (#8,278)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?