Moral Principles

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. -/- A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. (shrink)

The human factor in information systems is a large vulnerability when implementing cybersecurity, and many approaches, including technical and policy driven solutions, seek to mitigate this vulnerability. Decisions to apply technical or policy solutions must consider how an individual’s values and moral stance influence their responses to these implementations. Our research aims to evaluate how individuals prioritise different ethical principles when making cybersecurity sensitive decisions and how much perceived choice they have when doing so. Further, we sought to use participants’ (...) responses to cybersecurity scenarios to create profiles that describe their values and individual factors including personality. Participants (n = 193) in our study responded to five different ethically sensitive cybersecurity scenarios in random order, selecting their action in that scenario and rating and ranking of the ethical principles (i.e., Beneficence, Non-Maleficence, Justice, Autonomy, Explicability) behind that action. Using participants’ demographics, personality, values, and cyber hygiene practices, we created profiles using machine learning to predict participants’ choices and the principle of most importance to them across scenarios. Further, we found that, generalising, for our participants Autonomy was the most important ethical principle in our scenarios, followed by Justice. Our study also suggests that participants felt they had some agency in their decision making and they were able to weigh up different ethical principles. (shrink)

The book develops, defends, and applies a "Dual Scale" model of weighing reasons to resolve various issues in ethics. It tells you everything you ever wanted to know about weighing reasons and probably a lot of stuff you didn't want to know too. It addresses, among other things, what the general issue of weighing reasons is; what it is to weigh reasons correctly; whether reasons have more than one weight value (e.g., justifying, requiring, and/or commending weight); whether weight values are (...) context sensitive; how to tell what the weights of reasons are; how reasons for are related to reasons against; and how the weights of reasons aggregate. After addressing such issues, it explains a number of puzzling phenomena in ethics, such as the All or Nothing Problem, the normative significance of small improvements, and the intransitivity of the makes-it-permissible-to-act-against relation. (shrink)

This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy – in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the anti-hypocrisy requirement.

This is a paper about model-building and overfitting in normative ethics. Overfitting is recognized as a methodological error in modeling in the philosophy of science and scientific practice, but this concern has not been brought to bear on the practice of normative ethics. I first argue that moral inquiry shares similarities with scientific inquiry in that both may productively rely on model-building, and, as such, overfitting worries should apply to both fields. I then offer a diagnosis of the problems of (...) overfitting in moral inquiry and explain how our current practice seems worryingly susceptible to such problems. I conclude by giving suggestions for how we might avoid overfitting when doing normative ethics. (shrink)

Prisoners, those who probably engaged in criminal activities, might possess different perceptions and notions of moral foundations than non-prisoners. Thus, assessing such foundations among the population without testing the validity of the measure may produce biased outcomes. To address the potential methodological issue, we examined the validity of the measurement model for moral foundations among prisoners and community members, i.e., non-prisoners. We conducted the measurement invariance test and measurement alignment to test whether the model was consistently valid across the groups. (...) We also employed the differential item functioning test to examine whether item responses were not biased between the different populations. Results demonstrated significant measurement non-invariance and differential item functioning. However, measurement alignment could address the non-invariance issue. Between-group comparisons of moral foundations were consistent with findings from prior research after performing the alignment. (shrink)

A presente investigação tem por objetivo responder à questão título considerando os argumentos apresentados, de um lado, pelos desenvolvimentistas e, de outro, pelos ambientalistas. Entendemos que os argumentos apresentados refletem um conflito de valores mais profundo que, se abordado por uma metodologia de solução de conflitos adequada, pode contribuir para elucidação da questão. A metodologia proposta é o personalismo ético de Scheler. A hierarquia de valores a ser aplicada na solução de conflitos traz (i) o valor pessoa como o mais (...) elevado, seguido dos (ii) valores espirituais, como a justiça, (iii) os vitais, como o bem estar e o útil, e (iv) os sensíveis. Através das ações de preferir e postergar, é possível encontrar pontos de equilíbrio numa permanente atitude crítica. O objetivo é contribuir para que as ações ocorram com a devida diligência para com os direitos humanos. A hipótese inicial é que, identificando os valores em conflito e aplicando a metodologia descrita, a solução de conflitos neste caso concreto permite pensar numa transição energética que concilie o desenvolvimento e o meio ambiente. Compreendemos que ambos têm como fim proteger o valor pessoa. Portanto, o que está em conflito de fato, sem com isso assumir uma postura ingênua, são os valores espirituais e vitais de cada uma das partes. Neste sentido, defendemos que, diante da inevitável demanda por energia da sociedade contemporânea e do alto custo da transição energética, é preciso conciliar o desenvolvimento com o meio ambiente a partir de uma programada transição energética financiada pela exploração do petróleo e gás, mas com metas definidas comprometidas com a neutralidade da emissão de GEE em 2050. Para tanto, é necessário regulamentação, monitoramento e fiscalização por parte do Estado e do governo federal com a finalidade de garantir a substituição dos combustíveis fósseis por fontes energéticas limpas. (shrink)

It is necessary to have mastery of sciences for a voyage to Mars. Finances cannot be ignored either. But, after that, what? Why generate the related technology and for what purpose? Are only the computers going to live in a new colony to be established on Mars?

El artículo aborda el problema de la relación entre el ser humano y la técnica en el mundo actual desde una perspectiva filosófica. Volver a la concepción de la filosofía griega permite concebir hoy el quehacer filosófico como un ejercicio vital, sin fracturas entre el pensamiento y la acción. La patente plasticidad del ser humano evidencia la constitutiva apertura que determina su especificidad y, además, columbra la estrecha vinculación entre técnica, creación y cuidado a partir del acontecimiento del habitar. El (...) cuidado no puede tener lugar sin cierta promoción de un ethos cultural centrado en el miramiento, la asistencia y la preocupación por uno mismo y por el Otro. El olvido de la relación entre la creación y el cuidado conduce a un desequilibrio ethopoiético entre la condición ontológica del ser humano, como ser nacido, finito y vulnerable, y el desarrollo tecnológico, impulsado por la digitalización de la vida y el ascendente papel de las nuevas tecnologías en la sociedad. Advertir y remediar dicho desequilibrio supone repensar la originaria relación entre la creación técnica y el cuidado ético, así como la importancia de la ética para la persistencia de lo orgánico. (shrink)

Este trabajo critica del derecho y la economía, bajo la corriente desarrollada por Franz Hinkelammert. Se utiliza el método transdisciplinario, atravesando la Filosofía indígena, la Teología de la Liberación y la Filosofía de la Liberación. En el análisis de casos se recurre a la justicia comunitaria del pueblo kichwa Saraguro. Se critica que tanto la teoría como la filosofía del derecho grecorromana está centrada en la propiedad privada, que justifica y protege al sistema económico capitalista. La propuesta está centrada en (...) el cuidado de la vida, es decir, se busca que la teoría y filosofía del derecho tome como centro de análisis al sujeto vivo: personas, plantas, animales, montañas, etc. Esto, a su vez, constituye la crítica de la economía política, porque la teoría económica también está centrada de una manera necrótica en la generación de utilidades; y, cuando el derecho asume la reproducción de la vida como centro de protección, la economía también se transforma. (shrink)

On what conditions, if it all possible, can Christianity be life-affirming in line with the general schema outlined throughout Nietzsche's wide-ranging corpus? Through a post-modern interpretation of Christ as OverMan of course. Pack your crosses and your pentagrams and buckle up for this visual transmission of my most recent brainchild.

According to the received view in metaethics, a Neo-Humean theory of rationality entails that there cannot be any objective moral reasons, i.e. moral reasons that are independent of actual desires. In this paper, I argue that there is a version of this theory that is compatible with the existence of objective moral reasons. The key is to distinguish between (i) the process of rational deliberation that starts off in an agent's actual desires, and (ii) the rational principle that an agent (...) employs in such a process. I maintain that it is the latter which explains why it is rational for an agent to have a certain desire, not the former. As a result, there might be two types of principles. The second type of principle leaves room for objective moral reasons. (shrink)

Gli approcci della tradizione filosofica alla morale si fondano prevalentemente su concetti e teorie metafisiche e teologiche. Tra i concetti etici tradizionali, il più importante è la Teoria del Comando Divino (DCT). Secondo la DCT, Dio dà fondamenti morali all’umanità attraverso la sua creazione e attraverso la Rivelazione. Moralità e Divinità sono inseparabili fin dalle civiltà più remote. Questi concetti si inseriscono in un quadro teologico e sono accettati principalmente dalla maggior parte dei seguaci delle tre tradizioni abramitiche: ebraismo, cristianesimo (...) e islam: la parte più considerevole della popolazione umana. Tenendo come fondamento la fede e la Rivelazione, le Teorie del Comando Divino non sono strettamente soggette alla dimostrazione. Gli oppositori alla concezione della morale del Comando Divino, fondata sull'impossibilità di dimostrare i suoi presupposti metafisici e religiosi, hanno tentato per molti secoli (anche se senza successo) di sminuirne l'importanza. Sostenevano che esso non presenta prove materiali e coerenza logica e, per questo motivo, non può essere preso in considerazione per scopi scientifici o filosofici. È solo una convinzione e, come tale, dovrebbe essere intesa. Oltre a queste opposizioni estreme, molti altri concetti contravvengono alle teorie del Comando Divino, in un modo o nell'altro, in parte o del tutto. Dalla filosofia greca classica fino ai giorni nostri, molti filosofi e scienziati sociali sostengono che la moralità è solo un costrutto e quindi culturalmente relativo e culturalmente determinato. Tuttavia, ciò apre la strada a molte altre discussioni e impone la sfida di determinare il significato della cultura, quali elementi della cultura siano moralmente determinanti e, infine, i confini di tale relatività. I deterministi morali affermano che tutto ciò che riguarda il comportamento umano, inclusa la moralità, è determinato una volta che il libero arbitrio non esiste. Più recentemente, i pensatori moderni hanno sostenuto che esiste una scienza rigorosa della moralità. Tuttavia, pur spiegando numerosi fatti e prove, il metodo scientifico da solo non può illuminare l’intero contenuto e il pieno significato dell’etica. La comprensione della morale richiede una percezione più ampia e un accordo tra i filosofi, cosa che essi non hanno mai raggiunto. Queste domande hanno molte configurazioni diverse a seconda di ciascun filone filosofico e danno origine ad analisi complesse e dibattiti infiniti finché molti di essi sono reciprocamente conflittuali. L'universo e l'atmosfera che coinvolgono questa ricerca sono i domini di tutti questi conflitti concettuali, osservati da un punto di vista oggettivo ed evolutivo. Indipendentemente da questa circostanza e dalla sua intrinseca importanza; tuttavia, queste domande sono lontane dall’approccio metodologico di una discussione analitica sulla morale oggettiva, che è, in effetti, lo scopo e la portata di questo lavoro. Dovremmo rivisitare brevemente queste importanti teorie tradizionali perché questo lavoro ospita uno studio comparativo e i suoi presupposti differiscono profondamente da tutte le teorie tradizionali. -/- Diventa quindi necessario offrire al lettore elementi di confronto diretti e specifici per una critica valida, dispensando ricerche interruttive. Tuttavia, anche rivisitando le teorie tradizionali, a questo scopo di esposizione comparativa e critica, esse verranno tenute ai margini delle nostre preoccupazioni primarie come “aliena materia”. Indipendentemente dalla validità di alcuni o tutti gli elementi di questa discussione e dal loro significato come universo filosofico della nostra ricerca, lo scopo di questo lavoro è dimostrare e giustificare l’esistenza e il significato degli archetipi morali preistorici sorti direttamente dal contesto sociale fondamentale e corrispondenti bisogni e sforzi per la sopravvivenza. Tali archetipi sono la definizione del fondamento essenziale dell'etica, la sua aggregazione all'inconscio collettivo e la corrispondente logica di organizzazione e trasmissione agli stadi evolutivi del genoma umano e dei diversi rapporti spazio-temporali, indipendentemente da qualsiasi esperienza contemporanea dei singoli individui. Il sistema definito da questi archetipi compone un modello sociale umano evolutivo. È questa una posizione meta etica? Sì. Inoltre, come in ogni ragionamento meta etico, bisognerebbe cercare attentamente i percorsi migliori e più coerenti, come offre la Filosofia Analitica. Pertanto, questo lavoro dovrebbe ragionevolmente dimostrare che la morale non è un prodotto culturale degli uomini civilizzati o delle società moderne. Pur essendo soggetto a molteplici aggregazioni e sottrazioni culturali, i suoi fondamenti essenziali sono archetipici e non sono mai strutturalmente mutati. Questo ragionamento induce che la moralità sia un primo attributo dell'“homo sapiens”; non è una proprietà né un accidente: integra l'essenza umana e appartiene all'identità ontologica umana. I fenomeni umani sono un processo continuo, che gioca il suo ruolo tra determinazione casuale e libero arbitrio, e dobbiamo chiederci come è iniziata la moralità e come è arrivata a noi nel presente. (shrink)

En su libro Una ética sin fundamentos, Nicolás Zavadivker sostiene que la teoría ética y metaética de Mario Bunge pretende fundamentar las normas morales en premisas fácticas, sin hacer uso de valores. El presente trabajo discute esa tesis y sostiene que la teoría de Bunge busca construir y evaluar un sistema de valores y de normas, de forma rigurosa y sin arbitrariedad, a partir de conocimientos fácticos y valores de los evaluadores. Dado que la teoría de Bunge incluye valores entre (...) sus premisas argumentativas, es incorrecto categorizarla como una posición fundacionista que prescinde de valores. (shrink)

Explaining the supervenience of the moral on the natural is, perhaps, the central metaphysical challenge for the non-naturalist. However, Scanlon (2014) and Fogal and Risberg (2020) have developed a strategy which purports to explain supervenience rather simply. Fogal and Risberg call it the 'Divide and Conquer' strategy. The key idea is to postulate explanatory moral principles linking the natural and the moral. The moral principles are metaphysically necessary, so trivially supervene on the natural. All other moral facts are determined by (...) the necessary moral principles and the natural facts, so they supervene on the natural too. -/- I argue that there are two versions of the Divide and Conquer strategy and both fail. The first strategy doesn’t give an adequate explanation of supervenience because it doesn't properly identify what makes a difference to the holding of supervenience. The second perhaps does give an adequate explanation of supervenience, but only by introducing something similarly puzzling that needs explanation. -/- Consequently, non-naturalists need additional metaphysical machinery to develop their view -- just appealing to moral principles or metaphysical laws won't do the job. (shrink)

It may seem that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons differently, because ties in practical rationality tend to generate permissions and ties in epistemic rationality tend to generate a requirement to withhold judgment. I argue that epistemic and practical rationality weigh reasons in the same way, but they have different "default biases". Practical rationality is biased toward every option being permissible whereas epistemic rationality is biased toward withholding judgment's being required.

Some theorists of normative explanation argue that we can make sense of debates between first-order moral theories such as consequentialism and its rivals only if we understand their explanations of why the right acts are right and the wrong acts are wrong as generative (e.g. grounding) explanations. Others argue that the standard form of normative explanation is, instead, some kind of unification. Neither sort of explanatory monism can account for all the explanations of particular moral facts that moral theorists seek (...) to state and defend. This paper argues that we can do better if we accept normative explanatory pluralism, the view that at least some particular explananda in normative inquiry have more than one type of correct complete explanation. Such pluralism is supported by what goes on in actual moral inquiry, parallels an independently plausible form of pluralism about scientific explanation, and can offer principled responses to central objections. (shrink)

El presente trabajo de tesis se centra en el estoicismo, en la obra titulada Disertaciones que recoge las enseñanzas de Epicteto pero que fue recopilada por Arriano. Es en tal texto en el que principalmente basamos la presente tesis. Analizamos las enseñanzas de Epicteto, filósofo nacido en Hierópolis (Frigia) hacia el 55 d.C., que fue un liberto que se adentró en el estoicismo tras asistir a las clases del filósofo Musonio Rufo; gracias al permiso de su amo Epafrodito pudo asistir (...) a las pláticas de tal erudito. Los dos temas a tratar, el poder y el amor, que forman parte de la ética y de la filosofía política –estoicas-, así como de la epistemología, la física y la metafísica, por ser el sistema estoico uno que está estrecha y racionalmente interconectado, han sido abordados por investigadores recientes desde distintos ámbitos y perspectivas. El poder y el amor son conceptos que deben de ser explicados y analizados a partir de los conceptos mencionados de “sentimiento”, “inclinación”, “pasión”, “bueno”, “malo”, además de los de “virtud”, “vicio”, “indiferente”, “oikéiosis”, “deber”, “sabio”, “libertad”, etc. Por lo que ambas categorías han sido abordadas desde su vinculación con, o a partir de su explicación a través de, uno o varios de los conceptos mencionados. (shrink)

Die philosophischen, traditionellen Ansätze zur Moral beruhen hauptsächlich auf metaphysischen und theologischen Konzepten und Theorien. Unter den traditionellen Ethikkonzepten ist die göttliche Befehlstheorie die prominenteste (DCT). Gemäß der DCT gibt Gott der Menschheit moralische Grundlagen durch ihre Schöpfung und durch Offenbarung. Moral und Göttlichkeit sind seit der fernsten Zivilisation untrennbar. Diese Konzepte tauchen in einen theologischen Rahmen ein und werden hauptsächlich von den meisten Anhängern der drei abrahamitischen Traditionen angenommen: Judentum, Christentum und Islam: dem bedeutendsten Teil der menschlichen Bevölkerung. Die (...) göttlichen Befehlstheorien halten den Glauben und die Offenbarung für ihre Grundlage und unterliegen nicht strikt der Demonstration. Die Gegner der Gottesbefehlskonzeption der Moral, gegründet auf der Unmöglichkeit der Demonstration ihrer metaphysischen und religiösen Annahmen, haben seit vielen Jahrhunderten (obwohl erfolglos) versucht, ihre Bedeutung zu devalvieren. Sie hielten das Argument, dass es keine materiellen Beweise und logische Kohärenz zeigt und aus diesem Grund nicht für wissenschaftliche oder philosophische Zwecke berücksichtigt werden kann. Es ist nur ein Glauben und sollte daher verstanden werden. Abgesehen von diesen extremen Gegensätzen widersprechen viele andere Konzepte den Theorien des göttlichen Befehls, in der einen oder anderen Weise, teilweise oder vollständig. Von der klassischen griechischen Philosophie bis heute behaupten viele Philosophen und Sozialwissenschaftler, dass Moral nur ein Konstrukt ist und somit kulturell relativ und kulturell bestimmt ist. Dies führt jedoch zu vielen weiteren Diskussionen und stellt die Herausforderung dar, die Bedeutung der Kultur, welche Elemente der Kultur moralisch bestimmend sind, und schließlich die Grenzen dieser Relativität zu bestimmen. Moralischer Determinismus behaupten, dass alles, was mit menschlichem Verhalten zusammenhängt, einschließlich der Moral, bestimmt wird, sobald der freie Wille nicht existiert. In jüngerer Zeit haben moderne Denker argumentiert, dass es eine strenge Wissenschaft der Moral gibt. Doch trotz der Erklärung mehrerer Tatsachen und Beweise kann die wissenschaftliche Methode allein nicht den gesamten Inhalt und die volle Bedeutung der Ethik erleuchten. Das Verständnis der Moral erfordert eine breitere Wahrnehmung und eine Einigung unter den Philosophen, die sie nie erreicht haben. Diese Fragen haben viele verschiedene Konfigurationen, abhängig von jedem philosophischen Strang und beginnen komplexe Analyse und endlose Debatten, solange viele von ihnen gegenseitig widersprüchlich sind. Das Universum und die Atmosphäre, die diese Forschung beinhaltet, sind die Herrschaften all dieser konzeptionellen Konflikte, die aus objektiver und evolutionärer Sicht beobachtet werden. Ungeachtet dieser Umstände und ihrer intrinsischen Bedeutung sind diese Fragen jedoch weit entfernt vom methodischen Ansatz einer analytischen Diskussion über objektive Moral, die in der Tat das Ziel und den Umfang dieser Arbeit ist. Wir sollten diese prominenten traditionellen Theorien kurz überprüfen, weil diese Arbeit eine vergleichende Studie beherbergt, und ihre Annahmen unterscheiden sich zumindest tief von allen herkömmlichen Theorien. Daher wird es notwendig, dem Leser direkte und spezifische Elemente des Vergleichs für gültige Kritik anzubieten, ohne unterbrechende Forschung. Doch auch wenn wir die traditionellen Theorien für diesen vergleichenden und kritischen Expositionszweck überdenken, werden sie als „aliena materia" an der Seite unserer primären Anliegen gehalten werden. Unabhängig von der Gültigkeit eines oder aller der Elemente dieser Diskussion und ihrer Bedeutung als philosophisches Universum unserer Forschung, ist der Zweck dieses Werkes, dass die Existenz und die Bedeutung der prähistorischen moralischen Archetypen, die direkt aus den grundlegenden sozialen Bedürfnissen und Anstrengungen für das Überleben demonstrierten Archetypen sind, die Definition der wesentlichen Grundlage der Ethik, ihre Aggregation in das kollektive Unbewusste und die entsprechende logische Organisation und Übertragung auf die evolutionären Stadien des menschlichen Genoms und verschiedene Raum-Zeit-Beziehungen, unabhängig von jeder zeitgenössischen Erfahrung der Individuen. Das durch diese Archetypen definierte System bildet ein evolutionäres menschliches soziales Modell. (shrink)

Here is a puzzling phenomenon. Moral theories are typically thought to be necessary. If act utilitarianism is true, for example, then it is necessarily true. However, scientific theories are typically thought to be contingent. If quantum field theory is true, it’s not necessarily true — the world could have been Newtonian. My aim is to explore this discrepancy between domains. -/- In particular, I explore the role of what I call `internality’ intuitions in motivating necessitism about both moral and scientific (...) domains. In effect, these internality intuitions tell against the explanatory role of certain `external’ entities – like moral or scientific principles. I’ll suggest that perhaps these internality intuitions are more compelling in the moral case than the scientific case. If so, this would rationalize the combination of moral necessitism and scientific contingentism. (shrink)

Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant’s moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra Kleingeld and (...) Willaschek, the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is not voluntarist, and Rawls’s account of Kant’s concept of autonomy is not paradoxical. In order to understand autonomy, it is necessary to understand Kant’s complex conception of the will, which structures his moral philosophy (as Rawls, unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, explains). Rawls, like Kant, but unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, clearly distinguishes between certain importantly different questions about normativity and obligation. Kant’s moral philosophy, according to Rawls’s insightful interpretation, is a form of objective moral constructivism. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how realist moral naturalists can provide an intra-theoretic explanation of the epistemic possibility of wholesale moral error. This is a requirement on metaethical theories that has been recently defended by Akhlaghi (2021). After clarifying Akhlaghi’s argument and responding to Evers’s (2021) recent rebuttal, I argue that even under the assumption that moral facts are grounded in an appropriate subset of natural facts (N-facts), there is still a non-zero probability of wholesale moral error. This is demonstrated (...) by considering three types of epistemically possible scenarios: specifically, it could either be that N-facts do not actually exist, or that N-facts exist in a way that entails wholesale moral error, or that N-facts exist in a non-error theoretic way, but their existence is temporally restricted. (shrink)

Les approches de la tradition philosophique de la morale reposent principalement sur des concepts et des théories métaphysiques et théologiques. Parmi les concepts éthiques traditionnels, le plus important est la théorie du commandement divin (DCT). Selon la DCT, Dieu donne des fondements moraux à l'humanité par sa création et par la Révélation. Morale et Divinité sont inséparables depuis la civilisation la plus lointaine. Ces concepts plongent dans un cadre théologique et sont principalement acceptés par la plupart des adeptes des trois (...) traditions abrahamiques : le judaïsme, le christianisme et l'islam : la partie la plus considérable de la population humaine. Tenant la foi et la Révélation pour ses fondements, les Théories du Commandement Divin ne sont pas strictement sujettes à la démonstration. Les opposants à la conception de la morale du Commandement divin, fondée sur l'impossibilité de démontrer ses présupposés métaphysiques et religieux, ont tenté pendant de nombreux siècles (mais sans succès) d'en dévaloriser l'importance. Ils ont soutenu l'argument selon lequel il ne montre pas de preuves matérielles et de cohérence logique et, pour cette raison, ne peut pas être considéré à des fins scientifiques ou philosophiques. Ce n'est qu'une croyance et, en tant que tel, doit être compris. Outre ces oppositions extrêmes, de nombreux autres concepts contreviennent aux théories du Commandement Divin, d'une manière ou d'une autre, en partie ou en totalité. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a realist account of the modality of moral supervenience is superior to a non-cognitivist account. According to the recommended realist account, moral supervenience amounts to strong supervenience where the outer ‘necessary’ is conceptual and the inner metaphysical. It is argued that non-cognitivism faces a critical choice between weak and strong supervenience where both options are implausible on this view. However, non-cognitivism seems to have an important advantage: It can explain why the outer ‘necessary’ is (...) conceptual by reference to the function of moral language to influence behaviour. In the main part of the paper, I argue that realism is able to explain why ‘necessary’ in moral supervenience needs to be understood in the recommended manner by reference to the connection between moral properties and moral reasons. Moreover, I argue that the realist account has other attractive features. In contrast to non-cognitivism, it can unify the normative sphere by being generalizable to other normative notions. In addition, it can be part of an explanation of why moral language can have the function to influence behaviour. (shrink)

The utterance of morals or morality within a communist space is one that may, in the best of cases, raise a few eyebrows or, in the worst of cases, summon calls for condemnation or accusations of being unscientific. The subject of communist morality is one that is often ignored within the broader revolutionary left, while at the same time—especially within our current insurrectionary moment—beckons to be engaged with. As the hydra of neoliberalism begins its inevitable collapse, throwing capitalism once more (...) into a global crisis—and thusly its imperialist head begins to twist fascistically from the periphery back inward toward the United States and Europe—these categories that before seemed abstract and idealistic suddenly become vivid and tangible. Evil is how these injustices are described—in a non-hyperbolic fashion—by those engaged in the frontlines of revolutionary activity. So why is morality eschewed and denounced in left academic discourse? Are morals solely the provenance of the reactionary right or the dreamy idealist? (shrink)

Philosophers pursue a number of different explanatory projects when explaining various sorts of normative phenomena. This chapter takes some steps towards understanding this variety. I lay some general ground about explanation. I describe some key axes of debate about explanations that first-order normative inquiry typically seeks to state and defend. And I briefly discuss how two other sorts of normative explanation that seem more concerned with the foundations of normative domains like ethics and practical reason might be understood and how (...) they relate to first-order normative explanations. (shrink)

Although some previous studies have investigated the relationship between moral foundations and moral judgment development, the methods used have not been able to fully explore the relationship. In the present study, we used Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) in order to address the limitations in traditional regression methods that have been used previously. Results showed consistency with previous findings that binding foundations are negatively correlated with post-conventional moral reasoning and positively correlated with maintaining norms and personal interest schemas. In addition to (...) previous studies, our results showed a positive correlation for individualizing foundations and post-conventional moral reasoning. Implications are discussed as well as a detailed explanation of the novel BMA method in order to allow others in the field of moral education to be able to use it in their own studies. (shrink)

"Meritocracy" has historically been understood in two ways. The first is as an approach to governance. On this understanding, we seek to put meritorious (somehow defined) people into public office to the benefit of society. This understanding has its roots in Confucius, its scope is political offices, and its justification is consequentialist. The second understanding of "meritocracy" is as a theory of justice. We distribute in accordance with merit in order to give people the things that they deserve, as justice (...) demands. This understanding has its roots in Aristotle, its scope is social goods broadly, and its justification is deontological. In this article, I discuss the differences--especially the conceptual differences--between these two, prima facie distinct, meritocratic traditions. I also argue that despite their differences Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are harmonious. In Section I of the article I introduce the two meritocratic traditions through, in part, a highly abbreviated history of talk about "merit" and "meritocracy" in Chinese and Western philosophy. In Section II, I discuss a number of conceptual issues and partition meritocratic theories in accordance with their scopes and normative justifications. I also discuss two scenarios. In one scenario, Eastern Meritocracy appears to deliver the right result and Western Meritocracy, the wrong result. In the other scenario, vice versa. Finally, in Section III, I argue that Eastern Meritocracy and Western Meritocracy are each special cases of a single, compelling notion of "meritocracy.". (shrink)

I vindicate the thrust of the particularist position in moral deliberation. to this purpose, I focus on some elements that seem to play a crucial role in first-person moral deliberation and argue that they cannot be incorporated into a more sophisticated system of moral principles. More specifically, I emphasize some peculiarities of moral perception in the light of which I defend the irreducible deliberative relevance of a certain phenomenon, namely: the phenomenon of an agent morally coming across a particular situation. (...) Following on from Bernard Williams, I talk of an agent’s character as a factor that con- tributes to fixing what situations an agent comes morally across. A crucial point, in the debate, will be how an agent confronts the normatively loaded features of his own character when he is engaged in first-person deliberation. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has coincided with the proliferation of ethical guidance documents to assist public health authorities, health care providers, practitioners and staff with responding to ethical challenges posed by the pandemic. Like ethical guidelines relating to infectious disease that have preceded them, what unites many COVID-19 guidance documents is their dependency on an under-developed approach to bioethical principlism, a normative framework that attempts to guide actions based on a list of prima facie, unranked ethical principles. By situating them in (...) relation to the key philosophical debates concerning bioethical principlism, we aim to explore the limits and limitations of pandemic ethical guidance documents as, specifically, ethics documents – documents that fulfil the functions of ethics as a fundamentally normative discipline. This means not only determining whether such ethical guidance documents can, in principle, provide adequate action guidance and action justification, but also, more importantly where pandemics are concerned, determining whether they support consistent decision making and transparent processes of justification. Having highlighted the problems with merely furnishing ethical guidelines with substantive ethical content in terms of principles and values, we argue that organizations that develop these documents should, instead, focus on the procedural dimensions of action guidance and action justification, which extend to questions regarding the make-up of the committees, panels and groups that develop such guidelines, the public transparency of justifications for specific pandemic-related advice or interventions and the development of explicit procedures for transparent and consistent decision making. (shrink)

What ethical stance would be appropriate in today’s messy situation of health crisis, global warming, social and economic antagonisms, etc.? The first one is that of an expert who deals with the specific task imposed on him by those in power, blissfully ignoring the wider social context of his activity. The second one is that of pseudo-radical intellectuals who criticize the existing order from a comfortable morally superior position, well aware that their criticism will have no actual effects. How, then, (...) are we to go on living after we get rid of the illusions of a false critical stance? Not just by accepting our reality: the fascination with the end of our civilization make us spectators who morbidly enjoy the disintegration of normality. A way out of this deadlock is signalled by a line from a song by the German rock band Rammstein: “we have to live till we die”. We have to fight against the pandemic and other crises not by way of withdrawing from life but as a way to live with utmost intensity. Is there anyone more ALIVE today than millions of healthcare workers who with full awareness risk their lives on a daily base? Many of them died, but till they died they were alive. (shrink)

The late Robert Veatch, one of the United States’ founders of bioethics, never tired of reminding us that the paradigm-shifting contribution that bioethics made to patient care was to liberate patients out of the hands of doctors, who were traditionally seen to know best, even when they decidedly did not know best. It seems to us that with the advent of COVID-19, health policy has come full-circle on this. COVID-19 gave rise to a large number of purportedly “ethical” guidance documents (...) aiming to assist health care providers and practitioners with responding to the ethical challenges that might arise in their response to the pandemic. Ethics has two primary functions: provide clear action guidance, and provide clear action justification. The documents in question arguably reflect the ultimate policy triumph of bioethical “principlism”, and, perhaps surprisingly, as a corollary, the ultimate triumph of “doctor-knows-best”. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the study of ideological and philosophical components correlation in the worldview formation. According to the author, it is fundamentally important to take for understanding Russian history and culture not speculative, but ideological coordinates as the basis. Ideology as a professed philosophy is incomparably higher than any palliative abstraction. It is necessary not to lower culture to the level of the masses, but to elevate a person to the level of culture, impossible without a cult.

Albert the Great understands wisdom principally as a characteristic of human science, not principally as a feature of revealed theology. The article deals with the texts of his comments on Nicomachean Ethics and Metaphysics in order to know how he understands this knowledge.

It’s commonly held that particular moral facts are explained by ‘natural’ or ‘descriptive’ facts, though there’s disagreement over how such explanations work. We defend the view that general moral principles also play a role in explaining particular moral facts. More specifically, we argue that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. We consider two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles—’the nomic view’ and ‘moral platonism’—before (...) considering in what sense such principles obtain of necessity. (shrink)

Weighing competing obligations and achieving the “greatest balance” of right over wrong guides an individual, an agency or a country in determining what ought to be done in an ethically challenging situation. Conducting controlled human infection model (CHIM) studies in India is one such situation. The ethical challenge in conducting a CHIM study lies in completing the difficult task of introducing standardised, attenuated strains of micro-organisms into normal healthy volunteers, at the same time ensuring the safety of these healthy individuals (...) from potential and completely informed risks in a fashion that is transparent and accountable. The bar is further raised against the background of already fragile public confidence in biomedical research in India; especially when “deliberate” introduction of microbial agents into healthy individuals is involved, with the larger altruistic objective of gain to society as a whole. -/- This paper discusses the uses of CHIM studies with respect to the larger scientific Indian research enterprise of the 21st century. It further explores etic and emic perspectives in conducting such trials in India and seeks to generate an ethical coherence to the justification for conducting CHIM studies in India. The paper deliberates on ethical issues arising out of conducting CHIM studies and reflects on how developing the capacity for CHIM studies in India is likely to strengthen the health research and development sector in the country. -/- . (shrink)

I take issue with an argument to the effect that because contractualism proves--both practically and theoretically--the philosophically superior moral theory, we have the result that nonhuman animals can have no, nor ought be extended any, moral standing. The combined argument belongs to Peter Carruthers, and appears in his The Animals Issue. My response involves demonstration that on careful analysis contractualism fares even less well than the two theories against which Carruthers compares it--rights and utilitarian. Furthermore, I offer a sketch of (...) a theory which does not fall for reliance on a singularly problematic premise--a premise which plays pivotally in traditional contractualist, rights and utilitarian accounts. The upshot is that this "alternative rights theory" fares best in reflective equilibrium analysis as against not only those theories Carruthers decries, but contractualism as well. We are, it appears, drawn back to the nagging question of whether and how things nonhuman may matter morally. For, Carruthers conclusion is disallowed. That the alternative rights theory offers novel yet satisfactory means by which to account for moral motivation and knowledge, as well as differences in moral respect due morally relevant beings, is explored. That the theory avoids the troublesome pitfalls of intuitionism and supervenience further secures its frontrunning position--which, again, begins to indicate that and how more than solely humans are of moral relevance. (shrink)

I argue that moral principles, construed as moral generalizations, can be genuinely explanatory. Specifically, I present and respond to a challenge according to which moral generalizations are explanatorily redundant. In response, I present and defend an explanatory dimension of moral generalizations that is based on the idea of unification. I do so in the context of motivating a realist-friendly moral explanatory pluralism (i.e., the view that there can be many, equally legitimate, explanations of moral facts). Finally, I appeal to the (...) same theoretical resources to tackle an objection from explanatory circularity. (shrink)

Call ‘radical moral theorizing’ the project of developing a moral theory that not only tries to conform to our existing moral judgments, but also manifests various theoretical virtues: consistency, simplicity, explanatory depth, and so on. Many moral philosophers assume that radical moral theorizing does not require any particular metaethical commitments. In this paper, I argue against this assumption. The most natural justification for radical moral theorizing presupposes moral realism, broadly construed; in contrast, there may be no justification for radical moral (...) theorizing if moral anti-realism is true. (shrink)

I argue that moral principles involve the same sort of generalization as ordinary yet elusive generic generalizations in natural language such as ‘Tigers are striped’ or ‘Peppers are spicy’. A notable advantage of the generic view is that it simultaneously allows for pessimism and optimism about the role and status of moral principles in our lives. It provides a new perspective on the nature of moral principles on which principles are not apt for determining the moral status of particular actions (...) while they may be apt, and even fundamental, to our acquisition of moral knowledge. A natural consequence of the view is variation among moral principles, with some regularly warranting exceptions and some appearing arguably exceptionless. I will also argue that this generic conception of moral principles has significant advantages, as a normative model of moral reasoning, over the view of moral principles as defaults advanced in recent years. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic raises the need for an ethical framework that addresses the unique ethical challenges and questions arising from airborne infectious diseases. For example, are we ever ethically obliged to wear a face mask? If so, why and when? The Respiratory Ethics Framework (REF) herein proposes pathways to answers grounded in ethical norms and the moral principles of non-harm, beneficence and respect for personal autonomy. REF is a personal ethics wherein your ethical duty to increase your respiratory hygiene efforts—such (...) as by donning a mask—is proportional to your estimation of an increase in the likelihood that your respiratory effluent poses a risk of harmful infection to others. REF includes illustrated decision models that instantiate a framework of proportionality between levels of risk, ethical duty and mitigation that shapes risk mitigation across domains. (shrink)

This paper is a survey of the generalism-particularism debate in ethics. It's an updated version of "Moral Particularism", in Christian B. Miller (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Ethics (Continuum, 2011), pp. 247-260.

In this paper, I try to offer a full-fledged defense of principle-based ethics against moral particularism. My discussions not only refute particularists’ allegations against moral generalism but also provide a positive rationale for a principle-based approach in ethics. By borrowing insights from Brandom’s and Peregrin’s normative pragmatism, I describe the fundamental roles of moral principles. In my view, moral principles constitute morality, and they can function as default reasons in our moral deliberations. Moreover, I argue that my principle-based conception of (...) ethics has advantages over particularism since it explains the phenomenological experience and covers basic intuitions in the moral domain that particularists have difficulty explaining. (shrink)

Virtue theories can plausibly be argued to have important advantages over normative ethical theories which prescribe a strict impartialism in moral judgment, or which neglect people’s special roles and relationships. However, there are clear examples of both virtuous and vicious partiality in people’s moral judgments, and virtue theorists may struggle to adequately distinguish them, much as proponents of other normative ethical theories do. This paper first adapts the “expanding moral circle” concept and some literary examples to illustrate the difficulty of (...) adequately distinguishing virtuous from vicious partiality. Later sections aim to show how an adequate philosophical ethics will be able to both a) attribute virtue (and hence praiseworthiness) to agents whose actions may directly serve only their special interests, roles, or special relationships; and b) attribute vice (and hence censure) where an agent’s attitudes and/or actions mirror known personal biases (for instance, an egoistic attitude) or social biases (for instance, and ethnocentric attitude). This dual ability leaves space for much virtuous partiality, while also reflecting a “risk-aware” approach, recognizing the deleterious consequences of our human penchant for constructing and imbuing moral significance to oftentimes factitious us/them dichotomies. (shrink)

This paper offers a general model of substantive moral principles as a kind of hedged moral principles that can (but don't have to) tolerate exceptions. I argue that the kind of principles I defend provide an account of what would make an exception to them permissible. I also argue that these principles are nonetheless robustly explanatory with respect to a variety of moral facts; that they make sense of error, uncertainty, and disagreement concerning moral principles and their implications; and that (...) one can grasp these principles without having to grasp any particular list of their permissibly exceptional instances. I conclude by pointing out various advantages that this model of principles has over several of its rivals. The bottom line is that we should find nothing peculiarly odd or problematic about the idea of exception-tolerating and yet robustly explanatory moral principles. (shrink)

That human beings have the potential for rationality and the ability to cultivate it is a fact of human nature. But to value rationality and its subsidiary character dispositions - impartiality, intellectual discrimination, foresight, deliberation, prudence, self-reflection, self-control - is another matter entirely. -/- I am going to take it as a given that if a person's freedom to act on her impulses and gratify her desires is constrained by the existence of others' equal, or more powerful, conflicting impulses and (...) desires, then she will need the character dispositions of rationality to survive. The more circumscribed one's freedom and power, the more essential to survival and flourishing the character dispositions of rationality and the spirit may become. (shrink)

Cohen’s hostility to Rawls’ justification of the Difference Principle by social facts spawned Cohen’s general thesis that ultimate principles of justice and morality are fact-insensitive, but explain how any fact-sensitive principle is grounded in facts. The problem with this thesis, however, is that when facts F ground principle P, reformulating this relation as the "fact-insensitive" conditional “If F, then P” is trivial and thus explanatorily impotent. Explanatory, hence justificatory, force derives either from subsumption under more general principles, or precisely exhibiting (...) value in light of relevant (actual or hypothetical) facts. In examples where no subsumption occurs, actual facts trivially become hypothetical facts in "fact-insensitive" conditionals, an empty formalism. Indeed, Rawls’ grounding of principles of justice in “conditions of life” can easily be reformulated as a conditional principle “sensitive” only to hypothetical such conditions, and thus formally fact-insensitive in Cohen's sense, for all Cohen’s ire against Rawls’s grounding.Moreover, any plausible “ultimate fact-insensitive principle” must be intricately qualified, which tacit ceteris paribus clauses mask. Each qualification implies prioritisation of one principle over another in conceivable circumstances, and wherever the now qualified principle is given scope, that too implies prioritisation over competing principles in typical circumstances. Any principle is thus sensitive to conceivable circumstances of application, as recognised by more sophisticated intuitionisms. Non-trivial ultimate principles – luck egalitarianism, act utilitarianism, etc. - require defense, which inevitably involves showing how they best interpret and respond to facts about human needs, goals, and capacities in predictable circumstances. Finally, the substantive debate between Rawls and Cohen about which facts are relevant to the DP is only obscured by the doctrine of fact-insensitivity. (shrink)