Kant and the demandingness of the virtue of beneficence

European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):625-642 (2019)
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Abstract
We discuss Kant’s conception of beneficence against the background of the overdemandingness debate. We argue that Kant’s conception of beneficence constitutes a sweet spot between overdemandingess and undemandingess. To this end we defend four key claims that together constitute a novel interpretation of Kant’s account of beneficence: 1) for the same reason that we are obligated to be beneficent to others we are permitted to be beneficent to ourselves; 2) we can prioritise our own ends; 3) it is more virtuous to do more rather than less when it comes to helping others; and 4) indifference to others is vicious. Finally, we explain how this represents a system of duties that gives our personal ends a moral standing without unacceptably moralising them.
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2019
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FORKAT-9
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First archival date: 2019-04-28
Latest version: 1 (2019-11-18)
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2019-04-26

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